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Like Kind Replacement Property:
Animal, Vegetable, or Mineral?t
RIDGELEY A. SCOTT*
Gain or loss usually is recognized by a person who gives up prop-
erty. If an exchange satisfies the terms of a nonrecognition statute,
all or some of the gain or loss is deferred until there is a disposi-
tion of the replacement property. The like kind provision is the
general nonrecognition rule for exchanges of property. Although
the statute was enacted in 1921 to reduce uncertainty and litiga-
tion, there are several unanswered questions. Moreover, many like
kind issues have been resolved on an ad hoc basis. Professor Scott
traces the development of rules and standards, and suggests ap-
proaches which should lead to more logical results.
INTRODUCTION
The first modern federal income tax was enacted in 1913. Al-
though the statute made it clear that deductions were one topic and
income was another, they were silent as to the method for computing
income. Under the 1913 regulations, income from an exchange was
the fair market value of the property received reduced by the ad-
justed basis for the property given up.1 The rule from the 1913 regu-
lations was enacted in 1918.2 In 1921 Congress expressed displeasure
t Copyright retained by author.
* Professor of Law, Delaware Law School. LL.M. (Taxation) 1978, New York
University.
1. Treas. Reg. 33, arts. 107, 111 (1914), reprinted in 132 INTERNAL REVENUE
AcTs OF THE U.S. 1909-1950 (B. Reams ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as INTERNAL REVE-
NUE AcTs OF 1909-1950]; H.R. REP No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1918), reprinted in
1939-1 (pt.2) C.B. 88.
2. H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1918).
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with the rule and concluded that gain should not be taxed unless the
property received had a readily realizable market value.' In 1924
however, Congress decided the readily realizable standard could not
be applied with reasonable certainty, and went back to the 1918
approach.4
The continuity of investment principle was established by a Civil
War ruling on destruction of business property by fire. Losses were
not deductible to the extent that they were compensated f6r by in-
surance. A 1914 letter concluded that a loss did not occur until the
transaction was complete, hence an investment would continue until
property irredeemably disappeared from the assets of a person. 5 One
person used this 1914 letter as the basis of his request for a reorgani-
zation ruling. In a 1915 letter, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
found the transaction was not complete and concluded the exchange
was tax-free. A series of letters issued over the next few years cre-
ated a body of precedent for reorganizations. 6 Reorganization gain
was not realized unless the property received differed materially
from the property given up.
Reasonable persons can easily disagree over whether there is a
material difference between properties. When World War I ended
unexpectedly, the Finance Committee had nearly completed work on
the 1918 bill. A few days after the armistice, the Department of
Treasury (Treasury) asked for modifications designed for a post-war
economy. The Treasury emphasized a need for greater certainty in
the treatment of business. The Finance Committee responded by
amending the bill to provide nonrecognition for transfers to con-
trolled corporations and reorganization exchanges. Although the con-
trol corporation clause was deleted without explanation by the Con-
ference Committee, the reorganization material was enacted.
In 1921 the Treasury asked for nonrecognition in several situa-
tions.8 The general goals for the system were to increase revenue by
denying deductions based on wash sales and other fictitious ex-
3. S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt. 2)
C.B. 188-89.
4. S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1924), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt. 2)
C.B. 275.
5. Decision No. 110, Office of Internal Revenue, Decisions 60 (1871); Mim. Letter
to Collectors, Aug. 14, 1914, reprinted in 1916 INCOME TAX SERV. (CORP. TR. CO.)
181.
6. E.g., LTR (Apr. 1, 1915); LTR (Mar. 8, 1917), both reprinted in 1918 INCOME
TAX SERV. (CORP. TR. Co.) 11 398, 1302.
7. S. REP. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 2-3, 5-6 (1918); H.R. REP. No. 1037,
65th Cong., 3d Sess. 4 (1919), both reprinted in 1939-1 (pt. 2) C.B. 118-20, 132.
8. E.g., Revenue Act of 1921: Hearings on H.R. 8245 Before the Senate Finance
Comm., 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-28, 51-52, 55 (1921) (statement of Dr. T.S. Adams,
Tax Advisor, Department of Treasury). S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12
(1921), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt.2) C.B. 188-89.
1068
[VOL. 23: 1067. 1986] Like Kind Replacement
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
changes, and to stimulate the economy. The economy would be en-
couraged by modifying a presumption in favor of taxation, disap-
proving technical constructions which were economically unsound,
encouraging business adjustments, and reducing litigation and uncer-
tainty. Reducing uncertainty probably was the principal factor in the
drive to stimulate the economy. Congress enacted the proposals.
Hence gain was not recognized if the transaction was a reorganiza-
tion, transfer to a controlled corporation, involuntary conversion or
like kind exchange.9
These nonrecognition rules were continued without substantial
question until the early thirties. As the Great Depression intensified,
a search was begun for ways to reduce tax avoidance. A congres-
sional study found that the nonrecognition rules had frequently been
used as a means of tax avoidance. Repeal of all the nonrecognition
provisions was suggested. The Treasury opposed the suggestion be-
cause of a potential loss of revenue and of possible severe handicap-
ping of legitimate transactions. The Treasury also stated that twelve
years of experience with the like kind statute indicated it did not
result in tax avoidance. Congress found that the administrative cost
of treating like kind exchanges as taxable transactions would exceed
the additional revenue. 10 There is no record of congressional consid-
eration of repeal or substantial modification of the like kind statute
after 1934.
The replacement property is deemed to be a continuation of the
old investment if the transaction is a like kind exchange. Although
most of the requirements of the statute are relatively easy to apply,
ascertaining whether properties are sufficiently alike may be chal-
lenging. For property law purposes, an item is either real or personal
property. This distinction was created under roman law. The feudal
system amplified the importance of the distinction under English
law. In addition, each piece of land is deemed unique. A seller or
purchaser is usually entitled to the equitable remedy of specific per-
formance to enforce his contract. 1 Concluding that real and per-
9. H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1921); S. REP. No. 275, 67th
Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1921), both reprinted in 1939-1 (pt. 2) C.B. 175-76, 188-89.
10. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, 12-13 (1934), reprinted in 1939-1
(pt. 2) C.B. 554, 563-64. See generally Ways and Means Subcommittee, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess., Preliminary Report on Prevention of Tax Avoidance 8-9 (Comm. Print 1933);
Statement of the Acting Secretary of the Treasury on the Preliminary Report on Preven-
tion Tax Avoidance 9-10 (1933), both reprinted in 100 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF
1909-1950.
11. 5A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1143, 1145 (1964).
1069
sonal property can never be like kind is logically as absurd as sug-
gesting that no piece of land can be like kind to any other. Hence the
problem is how to draw points of comparison and distinction for like
kind purposes.
Administrative and judicial results do not reflect a reasonably con-
sistent application of like kind principles. Although many IRS deci-
sions tend to restrict the availability of nonrecognition of gain, some
are surprisingly liberal. Court decisions reflect a similar pattern of
inconsistency. This Article will trace the development of rules and
standards, and suggest approaches which should lead to more logical
results.
DEVELOPMENT OF A LIKE KIND STANDARD
Background
Dr. Thomas S. Adams was an economist who spent most of his
working life as a university professor. Tax was his specialty, and he
was employed by the Treasury from 1917 to 1922. Adams was the
principal architect of the legislative recommendations which the
Treasury presented to Congress in 1921, and he is generally recog-
nized as the father of the 1921 Act. 2
During Finance Committee hearings, Adams was asked for an il-
lustration. His response was an exchange of "stocks for stocks, or
bonds for bonds-or where a factory was exchanged for another fac-
tory." 13 Since legislative reports do not offer substantial guidance for
dealing with the like kind tests, the task of preparing rules or stan-
dards was delegated to the Treasury.
Pre-1921 Regulations
The continuity of investment doctrine was developed in rulings
and letters on reorganization exchanges and casualty losses.1 4 The
principle was adopted by the 1917 involuntary conversion regulation,
and was applied by the 1918 involuntary conversion and exchange
regulations.
Under the exchange regulation, the question was whether the re-
placement was "essentially different from the property disposed of
... . In other words [there must be] a change in substance and not
merely in form . . . to complete or close a transaction from which
12. Explanatory Note to the Legislative History of the 1921 Act, note 5 in 95
INTERNAL REVENUE AcTS OF 1909-1950.
13. Revenue Act of 1921: Hearings on the H.R. 8245 Before the Senate Finance
Comm., 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1921) (statement of Dr. T.S. Adams, Tax Advisor,
Department of Treasury).
14. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
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income may be realized."1 5 The exchange language was not changed
in subsequent versions of the regulations under the 1918 Act, and
was included in the regulations under the 1921 Act. 6 The regula-
tions under the 1924 Act did not include an exchange clause. Per-
haps it was deleted because the statutory nonrecognition provisions
added by the 1921 Act appeared to provide sufficient coverage.
When Congress was considering the 1934 Act, the primary concern
was raising revenue by preventing tax avoidance. Apparently the ex-
change clause was resurrected as an additional weapon against tax
avoidance. The 1934 language was whether the properties differed
"materially in kind or extent .... ."" The 1934 language was con-
tinued and appears in the current regulations.1 "
Presumably both versions of the exchange regulation employ the
same test.19 Without interpretation, the clause is useless as a plan-
ning tool because reasonable minds can differ about the degree of
change which would flow from a proposed transaction. In theory the
provision could apply in two transactional patterns. If the owner of
asset A exchanges it for asset B, and no material difference in the
assets exists, then no gain or loss should be realized. No decision
which reaches that conclusion has been located. The exchange provi-
sion has been applied in a variety of situations where the transaction
resulted in a mere modification in the form of ownership.20 When a
transfer is in recognition of the legal21 or equitable title22 of the re-
cipient, application of the exchange doctrine is reasonable. If the re-
cipient did not have a vested title before the exchange transaction,
there is doubt about whether a transfer is mere modification of
ownership.
The exchange regulation was frequently applied in divorce prop-
erty settlement situations. If the parties were co-owners of an item of
15. Treas. Reg. 45 (preliminary), arts. 1563-64 (1919), reprinted in 134 INTERNAL
REVENUE AcTs OF 1909-1950.
16. Treas. Reg. 62, art. 1564 (1922), reprinted in 136 INTERNAL REVENUE AcTs
OF 1909-1950.
17. Treas. Reg. 86, art. I I 1-1 (1935), reprinted in 140 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS
OF 1909-1950.
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (1972).
19. See Weiss v. Stein, 254 U.S. 242 (1924); Rev. Rul. 81-204, 1981-2 C.B. 157.
1184 (1930), acq., X-1 C.B. 39 (1931); LTR 7831035 (May 5, 1978).
20. E.g., Ohmstead v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 429 (1960), aff'd, 304 F.2d 16 (9th
Cir. 1962). Compare Rev. Rul. 72-269, 1972-1 C.B. 222 with Rev. Rul. 79-135, 1979-1
C.B. 78.
21. E.g., Rev. Rul. 56-437, 1956-2 C.B. 507.
22. For example, a trust or estate usually does not realize gain on distribution of
appreciated property to the beneficiaries. Treas. Reg. § 1.661(a)-2(f)(l) (1973).
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property, the exchange provision applied to partition of the item.
When the values received by each person were about equal, gain or
loss was not realized even if the parties received different properties.
In one case, the husband received the stock of the family business
corporation, and the wife received the family residence plus cash.23
Although a person who received cash for property was usually
treated as having made a sale, the Tax Court found the cash quali-
fied for exchange treatment because it was a jointly held asset.24
When appreciated property was transferred in satisfaction of an
ordinary contract claim, gain was realized. Even if the creditor held
a mortgage or other security interest and the conveyance was made
under threat of foreclosure, the transfer was deemed in response to
the claim.25 The middle ground was when a claim created a degree
of interest in the assets of another person. A marital property right
similar to common-law dower or courtesy created an inchoate prop-
erty right which did not appear to differ materially from a share-
holder's claim for his portion of corporate earnings. In concluding
that a corporation did not realize gain if it used appreciated property
to pay a dividend, the courts emphasized the preexisting right of the
shareholder. In reaching the contrary result where appreciated prop-
erty was transferred in satisfaction of rights similar to common-law
dower or courtesy, the courts emphasized the existence of an
obligation.2"
The exchange regulation was not applied consistently in cases in-
volving rights similar to common-law dower or courtesy. Although
the person who conveyed property was subject to tax, the IRS did
not attempt to tax the person who had released a marital property
right. Unless an owner had a basis for a right, the entire amount
received for a release appears to have been realized gain.27 Without
offering an explanation, the IRS decided that gain was not realized
when cash or property was received for releasing a marital property
right.28 The inconsistencies were largely eliminated by the 1984 Act
which included a nonrecognition rule for most marital property
23. Carriers v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 959 (1975), acq., 1976-1 C.B. 1, aff'd, 552
F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1977).
24. Id.
25. See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947); Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a) (l)-
(2) (1980); Rev. Rul. 75-111, 1976-1 C.B. 214.
26. See generally Hackler, Tax Clinic on Capital Gains, 12 CASE W. RES. L. REv.
244, 247-48 (1961); Malloy, Some Tax Aspects of Corporate Distributions in Kind, 6
TAX L. REv. 57 (1950); Minz & Plumb, Dividends in Kind-The Thunderbolts and the
New Look, 10 TAX L. REv. 41 (1954); I.R.C. §311(b)(1) (1986).
27. Scott, Recent Developments in the Federal Income Tax Laws-A Selective
Survey of Recent Judicial Decisions, 41 N.C.L. REv. 780, 795-99 (1963).
28. Rev. Rul. 79-312, 1979-2 C.B. 29; see also Howard v. Commissioner, 447 F.2d
152 (5th Cir. 1971).
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settlements.29
Pre-1921 Legislative Materials
The 1918 Act was the first statute which expressly covered ex-
changes. Shortly after the unexpected surrender of the central pow-
ers, the Treasury asked the Senate for changes designed to en-
courage business in a post-war economy. Property received would be
deemed cash except in two situations which were described as pure
paper transactions. One was an exchange of stock or securities in
connection with a reorganization, and the other was a transfer of
property to a controlled corporation. The Conference Committee
clarified the reorganization material by adding a boot rule, and did
not offer an explanation for deleting the control corporation
provision.30
The Treasury felt there was an urgent need for a control corpora-
tion rule. Shortly after the conference decision, the Treasury created
an exemption by regulation. A few months later, the exemption was
withdrawn because the Treasury decided it was not authorized by
law.31
The Treasury had a more ambitious legislative program in 1919.
The proposal was based on several types of experience, including
problems which came to light when the regulations were being
drafted. In addition to variations on the control corporation and reor-
ganization themes, the Treasury asked for involuntary conversion
legislation. The Secretary of the Treasury did not approve the 1919
program, and no tax legislation was enacted until 1921 .32
Use Test
The origin of the use test is not clear. The 1918 involuntary con-
version regulation was eight times longer than the 1917 version. One
new requirement was that the properties serve the same purpose.33 In
29. I.R.C. § 1041 (1986), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 793-
94.
30. S. REP. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 2-3, 5-6 (1918), H.R. REP. No. 1037,
65th Cong., 3d Sess. 44 (1919), both reprinted in 1939-1 (pt. 2) C.B. 118-120, 132.
31. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1566 (1919), modified, T.D. 2924 (1919), both reprinted
in 134 INTERNAL REVENUE AcTS OF 1909-1950.
32. Letter from Carter Glass, Secretary of Treasury, to Joseph W. Fordney,
Chairman, Ways and Means Committee (Nov. 3, 1919) (letter transmitting report in the
form of notes); Notes on the Revenue Act of 1918, both reprinted in 94 INTERNAL REVE-
NUE AcTs OF 1909-1950.
33. Reg. 45, art. 47, reprinted in 134 INTERNAL REVENUE AcTS OF 1909-1950.
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1919 and 1921 the Treasury asked for involuntary conversion legisla-
tion which included a use test.34 In 1921 the Treasury made a like
kind proposal which included a use test.
Under the 1921 Act, the properties must be of "like kind or
use."' 35 Since the requirements were expressed in disjunctive lan-
guage, an exchange appeared to qualify if it satisfied either criteria.
Hence a business could have avoided recognition on an exchange of
land for movables. The Treasury may have had a different opinion.
The first sentence of the regulations suggested the like kind test ap-
plied to investment properties only, while the use test was reserved
for business properties. Subsequent comments made it clear that the
Treasury also applied the like kind criterion to business properties.
Thus like kind or use would become like kind and use and a business
could not have avoided recognition from exchanging land for
movables. 36
Inconsistency bred controversy which led to repeal of the use test.
A 1924 Treasury report identified some of the classification problems
and concluded that use was not a fair basis for determining tax lia-
bility. The Treasury suggested that like kind was an acceptable cri-
terion. Congress agreed that use was not a fair test and enacted the
Treasury proposal.
3 7
Origin of Like Kind Language
Like kind is a term of uncertain ancestry. The phrase in kind re-
fers to property other than cash. For example, an employee who
makes free personal use of a company car has received a salary pay-
ment in kind.38 The 1918 involuntary conversion regulation was the
first nonrecognition authority to employ the term in kind. Involun-
tary conversion treatment was available if the owner proceeded
immediately in good faith to replace the property .... [T]he gain ... is
measured by the excess of the amount received over the amount ... ex-
pended to replace or restore the property substantially in kind, exclusive of
any expenditures for additions or betterments. The new or restored property
effects a replacement in kind only to the extent that it serves the same pur-
pose as the property which it replaces without added capacity or element of
additional value.39
34. Notes on the Revenue Act of 1918, at 15, reprinted in 94 INTERNAL REVENUE
AcTs OF 1909-1950.
35. Revenue Act of 1921, § 202(d)(1).
36. Treas. Reg. 62, art. 1566(a) (1921), reprinted in 136 INTERNAL REVENUE
AcTs OF 1909-1950.
37. Statement of the Changes Made in the Revenue Act of 1921 by the Treasury
Draft and the Reasons Therefore 11-12 (1924), reprinted in 66 INTERNAL REVENUE
AcTs OF 1909-1950.
38. See H.R. REP No. 432, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1593 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS; Payments-in-Kind Tax Treatment Act of 1983, 97 Stat.
7; 3 B. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME. ESTATES AND GiFTs 1 92.3.1 (1981).
39. Treas. Reg. 45 (preliminary), art. 47 (1918), reprinted in INTERNAL REVENUE
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In 1919 the Treasury asked for involuntary conversion legisla-
tion.40 Nonrecognition would have been available for a "replacement
in kind."41 In 1921 Congress adopted the Treasury proposal which
required "acquisition of other property of a character similar or re-
lated in service or use to the [converted] property."42 The floor man-
ager of the 1921 house bill used two phrases to describe a qualified
replacement. One was "other similar property-that is, replaces the
property destroyed or taken . . . . The other phrase was "prop-
erty of that same kind-for instance, a vessel [or] a house . . .
He also suggested that the statute would merely continue existing
Treasury practice. 45 Even after sixty-five years, the criterion identi-
fied by the statute is not clear.
When the Treasury recommended making like kind the sole crite-
rion in 1924, it did not suggest a meaning for the phrase.46 There
was no mention of the definitional problem during hearings on the
bill or in the legislative histories. The 1924 Act made like kind the
sole criterion. Modifications were considered in 1934, 1969 and
1984. 4  The statute was not amended in 1934, and the 1969 and
1984 changes were addressed to limited circumstances. 48 There is no
record of congressional consideration of the general like kind crite-
rion after 1921.
Congressional Intent
The Treasury did not offer an explanation for the term like kind.
During Finance Committee hearings, Adams was asked for an illus-
tration. His response was an exchange of "stocks for stocks, or bonds
for bonds---or where a factory was exchanged for another factory." 49
ACTS OF 1909-1950.
40. Notes on the Revenue Act of 1918, 15 (1919), reprinted in 65 INTERNAL REV-
ENUE AcTs OF 1909-1950.
41. Id.
42. Revenue Act of 1921, § 214(a)(12).
43. 61 CONG. REC. 5201, 5296 (Aug. 18-19, 1921) (statement of Rep. Hawley).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See infra notes 49-73 and accompanying text.
47. Statement of the Changes Made in the Revenue Act of 1921 by the Treasury
Draft and the Reasons Therefore 11-12, reprinted in 66 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF
1909-1950.
48. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt.
2) C.B. 563-64; S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 102, reprinted in 1969-3 C.B.
241-42; H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1231-33 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 895-97.
49. Revenue Act of 1921: Hearings on the H.R. 8245 Before the Senate Finance
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There are no other direct statements in any legislative report.
Various circumstances suggest a construction. One indication
flows from comparing recognition and nonrecognition provisions.
Property received in an exchange was deemed the equivalent of cash
unless the transaction satisfied the conditions for nonrecognition.5"
The 1918 exchange regulation was the first general modification of
the system, and applied when there was no essential difference in the
properties.51
The first group of nonrecognition statutes was enacted in 1921.
The general goals for the system were to increase revenue by deny-
ing deductions based on wash sales and other fictitious exchanges
and to stimulate the economy. The economy would be stimulated by
modifying a presumption in favor of taxation, disapproving technical
constructions which were economically unsound, encouraging busi-
ness adjustments, and reducing litigation and uncertainty. 2
Congress has offered what seem to be several different explana-
tions of the purpose of the like kind provision.53 There are two ap-
proaches to the explanations. One is to assume they reflect a variety
of ways to express the general goal of the statute. A more critical
eye might reach the contrary conclusion because the explanations
are not completely consistent. A 1981 article analyzed legislative
documents from 1918 to 1934, and suggested the explanations
should be categorized as expressing cashing-in, liquidity, and valua-
tion purposes.5 4 The author observed that these purposes have never
been carefully distinguished, and that
liquidity emerges as perhaps the purpose most consistent with section 1031,
although that purpose is too vague to assist in interpretation. Cashing-in
also survives as a purpose, although the taxable boot rule and the lack of a
rule covering reinvestments show cashing-in not to have been a primary
purpose. Valuation remains a purpose only in the pure exchange not involv-
ing boot. 5
Congress does not seem interested in providing careful distinc-
tions. The legislative history of the 1984 Act advances cashing-in
and valuation as reasons for imposing time limits on deferred ex-
Comm., 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1921) (statement of Dr. T.S. Adams, Tax Advisor,
Department of Treasury).
50. Revenue Act of 1918, § 202(a).
51. Treas. Reg. 45 (preliminary), art. 1566(a), reprinted in 134 INTERNAL REVE-
NuE AcTs OF 1909-1950.
52. See supra text accompanying note 8.
53. For example, compare S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1924)
with H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934), both reprinted in 1939-1 (pt. 2)
C.B. 278, 564.
54. Bryce, Deferred Exchanges: Nonrecognition Transactions After Starker, 56
TUL L. REv. 42 (1981). Compare Jenson, The Uneasy Justification for Special Treat-
ment of Like-Kind Exchanges, 4 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 193 (1985).
55. Bryce, supra note 54, at 58.
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changes.56 The discussion may also reflect the liquidity approach.
Failure to state a clear purpose seems to support the idea that the
various statements are merely different ways of expressing the gen-
eral goal of the statute. The best legislative formulation of the gen-
eral goal was offered in support of the substitute basis rule. The
1924 Senate report observed that the nonrecognition
provisions are based on the theory that the ... exchanges ... are merely
changes in form and not in substance .... [T]hese provisions result not in
an exemption ... but in a postponement of tax until the gain is realized by
a pure sale or by such an exchange as amounts to a pure sale.5
Exemptions usually are governed by conditions which are more
strict than the requirements of a postponement. One case involved a
contract which had been given a value for estate tax purposes.58 The
owner argued that the contract could not have been given a value for
income tax purposes because the amount which he might have re-
ceived was very speculative. As contrasted to the estate tax, the in-
come tax is a continuing affair. The Supreme Court observed that
gain which was not taxed in a given year in effect could be taxed in
a subsequent year and concluded that the contract would not be
given a value for income tax purposes.5 9 Under the installment
method of reporting, gain usually is not recognized when property is
sold for buyer's promise to pay money in future years. The fact that
the promise is negotiable or readily marketable, and could easily be
converted to cash, ordinarily is not material. Hence transferring
property for a promise which could easily be converted to cash is not
a transaction which amounts to a pure sale.60
Other statutes make nonrecognition available under similar cir-
cumstances. Under each statute the question is whether the replace-
ment property is the deemed equivalent of the property given up.
Suppose a person gives up all the stock and bonds in a mom-and-pop
grocery store for a small percentage of the listed and readily market-
able stock of a large conglomerate. If the exchange is a qualified
reorganization, realized gain is not recognized. Differences in invest-
56. H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1231-33 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 895-97.
57. S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1924), reprinted in 1939-I (pt.
2) C.B. 278. See Magneson v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 767, 772 (1983), affd 753 F.2d
1490 (9th Cir. 1985).
58. Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931); see also Bangor & Aroostook R.R. v.
Commissioner, 193 F.2d 827 (1st Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 934 (1952).
59. Burnet, 283 U.S. at 412-14.
60. I.R.C. §§ 453(a), (c), (f)(2)-(2)(4) (1986). See Commissioner v. South Tex.
Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 503 (1948).
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ment or economic position are not relevant because the stocks re-
ceived are deemed the equivalent of the stocks and bonds given up., l
Like kind postponement is available under comparable conditions.
If the properties are like kind, apparent dissimilarities are not perti-
nent. In one case, a person gave up oil, gas, and other minerals for a
hotel. 2 The only apparent similarity between the properties was that
each was an interest in land. The court observed that the statute
"was not intended to draw any distinction between parcels of real
property however dissimilar they may be in location, in attributes
and in capacities for profitable use."' 3 The IRS promptly announced
disagreement with the decision. 4 Eleven years after it was affirmed
on appeal, the IRS withdrew the disagreement and published
agreement. 65
It has been suggested that Congress intended one standard for
land and a different standard for movables. 6  There is no evidence to
support that observation. The legislative reports contain little or no
information about what Congress had in mind. Many of the state-
ments are contradicted by other statements. Contemporaneous regu-
lations reflect more confusion than the legislative histories.67
The 1921 regulation concluded that stock and evidence of indebt-
edness were not the same kind or class of property.68 In a 1928 opin-
ion which was officially reported, the Board of Tax Appeals (Board)
upheld the distinction. 9 The Board found it was
not necessary to point out the numerous differences in the character and
uses of these two forms of property. Generally a share of stock evidences an
interest in the ownership of a corporation, while a bond evidences simply an
obligation of the corporation. The bondholder stands somewhat in the posi-
tion of a mortgagee.70
The Board concluded that the regulation properly construed the stat-
ute. That was the only judicial success for the distinction between
stock and evidence of indebtedness. In a 1929 opinion which was
61. I.R.C. § 354(a) (1)-(2) (1986). LTR 8117215 (Jan. 30, 1981); LTR 7824036
(Mar. 16, 1978). B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORA-
TIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 14-15 (4th ed. 1979). Another letter reaches the same result
for a transfer to a controlled conglomerate. LTR 8307127 (Nov. 19, 1982).
62. Crichton v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 490 (1940), nonacq., 1940-2 C.B. 10,





66. E.g., California Fed. Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 680 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir.
1982).
67. See infra text accompanying note 77.
68. Treas. Reg. 62, art. 1566(a) (1921), reprinted in 136 INTERNAL REVENUE
ACTS OF 1909-1950.
69. Edson v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 621 (1928), rev'd sub nom. Edson v. Lucas,
40 F.2d 399 (8th Cir. 1930).
70. Id. at 634-35.
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reviewed, the Board overruled the 1928 opinion.71 After considering
the legislative histories, the opinion observed that:
If the test lies in an identity of legal rights inherent in the property, the
provision could be practically nullified. Is preferred stock only to be ex-
changed for preferred stock, and if so, is all preferred stock to be treated as
of like kind? .... By virtue of what test is investment property to be
classified if. . . all real estate is treated as of a kind, such as city lots for a
ranch, . . . while securities are to be classified according to their "nature,"
so that stocks of all classes are of like kind, such as common and preferred,
. . . but are not of like kind with debenture bonds? . . . To say that indus-
trial bonds on the one hand, and municipal, State and Federal bonds on the
other, differ only in "grade or quality" and not in "kind or class" . . . cre-
ates a strained distinction. Congress has laid down no such test in the Act
and nothing in its legislative reports indicates such a restriction on the ordi-
nary meaning of the language used. The regulation goes further than the
statute and is . . . unauthorized.2
Although the IRS promptly announced disagreement, people pre-
vailed in both cases. On appeal of the 1928 decision, the Eighth Cir-
cuit indicated that stocks and bonds were part of a class of property
described as investment securities.7 3 On appeal of the 1929 decision,
the Second Circuit held that stocks and bonds were part of the class
of personal property.74
Regulations
Standing by itself, the term like kind has little or no meaning. The
task of publishing rules or standards was delegated to the Treasury.
The 1921 regulation attacked the problem with lots of words and
inconsistent propositions. 76 Hence the Treasury seems to have been
unable to formulate a satisfactory approach.
Under the 1921 regulation, properties were like kind if they had
the same nature or character. Grade or quality was not to have been
considered in ascertaining whether properties were like kind. Cur-
sory examination of a dictionary or thesaurus reveals that the words
standing by themselves have little or no utility for dealing with spe-
cific transactions. Several observations provided a degree of meaning.
Land was land regardless of arguable differences. Hence the pres-
ence or absence of improvements went to grade or quality, and did
71. Greene v. Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 401 nonacq., VIII-1 C.B. 54 (1929), afJd,
42 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1930).
72. Id. at 407.
73. Edson, 40 F.2d at 400.
74. Greene, 42 F.2d at 854.
75. Tres. Reg. 62, art. 1566(a) (1921), reprinted in 135 INTERNAL REVENUE AcTs
OF 1909-1950.
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not affect nature or character.7 6 On the other hand, land and mov-
ables did not have the same nature or character since they differed
in kind or class. Thus the Treasury seemed to have adopted the com-
mon-law distinction between land and movables. Evidence of indebt-
edness was a kind or class of property and corporate stock was
another.Y
The regulations were not changed between 1921 and 1923. In
1923 the stock and evidence of indebtedness examples were deleted
for transactions after 1922.78 Several changes were made by the
1924 regulations. Material relating to the use test was deleted for
exchanges after 1924. The other modifications were addition of a
rule for long-term leases and a boot example where a person gave up
real estate for cash and real estate.7 9
The regulations were not changed between 1924 and 1934. The
1934 regulation looks like a throw back to 1921 because it contains
inconsistent statements and a use test. Most of the land examples are
the same as those in the 1924 regulation. One modification was the
deletion of a provision which approved exchanges of real estate for
real estate. Since other clauses made it clear that land was a single
class of property, the deleted material presumably was considered
surplusage. The other change was the addition of an example per-
mitting an exchange of urban land for a ranch or farm. The new
example was added to publicize approval of a series of decisions ren-
dered in the late twenties.8 0
Other examples do not seem to have been carefully considered.
The regulation observed that gain or loss is not recognized by a per-
son who
exchanges property held for productive use in his trade or business, together
with cash, for other property of like kind for the same use, such as a truck
for a new truck or a passenger automobile for a new passenger automobile
to be used for a like purpose, or ... exchanges investment property and
cash for investment property.81
There are several ways to look at those examples. They might
have been a mere expression of results where a transaction was in
part a like kind exchange and the balance was a cash purchase.8 2 It
76. Id.
77. id.
78. T.D. 2468, reprinted in 11-1 C.B. (1923).
79. Treas. Reg. 65, arts. 1572(a), 1573 (1924), reprinted in 137 INTERNAL REVE-
NUE AcTs OF THE US. 1909-1950.
80. Treas. Reg. 86, art. 112(b)(l)l (1934), reprinted in 140 INTERNAL REVENUE
AcTs OF 1909-1950. E.g., G.C.M. 2641, VI-2 C.B. 16 (1927) (farm for city land), de-
clared obsolete, Rev. Rul. 69-31, 1969-1 C.B. 307; Braley v. Commissioner, 14 B.T.A.
1153 (1929) (improved city land for ranch), acq., VIII-2 C.B. 6 (1929).
81. Treas. Reg. 86, art. 112(b)(1)-I (1934), reprinted in 140 INTERNAL REVENUE
AcTS OF 1909-1950.
82. See infra text accompanying notes 114-30.
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does not require much imagination to put the examples to other uses.
The investment clause appears to have covered any exchange, if both
items were held for investment and the person had given up cash.
Hence rare books would have been like kind to land. The business
example also may have imposed a use test. Some IRS rulings seem
to have extended the use clause into the sole criteria for certain busi-
ness movables. 83 Examples which lack conspicuous consistency fail to
satisfy the congressional goal of reducing uncertainty.
The regulations were not changed from 1934 to 1939. The 1939
regulations added a boot example where an apartment house subject
to a mortgage was exchanged for another apartment house plus
cash. 4 The regulations were not changed from 1939 to 1954. The
1954 regulations introduced several modifications. The primary goal
of most of the changes was further illustration of the treatment of
liabilities and other aspects of boot. An exchange of properties which
are identified only as apartment houses, or as real estate, does not
suggest modification of the general like kind criterion for land. The
declaration that land and movables were not the same kind or class
of property was included in every edition of the regulations from
1921 through 1953. Perhaps the Treasury felt the distinction was
continued by examples where stock and an automobile were boot to
exchanges of land. Several land exchanges include boot in the form
of cash and mortgages.85
It is not clear why the Treasury made land a class or kind of prop-
erty. Adams was an economist who was intimately involved with the
like kind situation. He may have concluded that so long as an invest-
ment was continued in the same general sort of illiquid asset, the
Treasury was willing to live with differences which were bound to
arise. The first exception was created in 1924, when a fee interest
was equated to a leasehold of a fee with at least thirty years to run.86
A long-term leasehold created a substantial relationship between the
property interest of the tenant and the leased land. There is com-
mon-law precedent for modifying the classification of property. 7 The
typical dispute over the title to farm land also involved equipment.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 341-64.
84. Treas. Reg. 103, §§ 19.112(b)(1)-1, 19.113(a)(6)-2 e.g. (2) (1939), reprinted
in 143 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF 1909-1950.
85. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(d)-l(c) e.g. (1967); id.-l(e).
86. Treas. Reg. 65, art. 1572(a) (1924), reprinted in 137 INTERNAL REVENUE
ACTS OF 1909-1950.
87. F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 149-50 (2d ed.
1899).
1081
The same rules were applied to both types of property. Hence the
distinction between land and movables was disregarded where there
was a sufficient relationship between the properties. 88
In contrast to the treatment of land, the Treasury has not pub-
lished a general criterion for classifying movables. Perhaps the Trea-
sury was unable to formulate a satisfactory general standard.89 The
1921 regulation dealt with the subject in a tangential manner by
concluding that land and movables were not the same kind or class
of property. The regulation did contain material on stocks and evi-
dences of indebtedness. Stocks were one kind or class of property,
and evidences of indebtedness were another. The phrase "evidence of
indebtedness" included notes and bonds, and classification was not
affected by security. Hence the unsecured note of an insolvent indi-
vidual was like kind to a secured bond issued by Standard Oil of
New Jersey and listed on the New York Stock Exchange.90 Never-
theless, the Treasury concluded that evidence of indebtedness and
stock were not of the same kind or class of property. The stock and
evidence of indebtedness material was deleted in 1923.91
The treatment of movables was not changed from 1923 to 1934. A
motor vehicle clause was added in 1934.92 This clause equated a
used truck to a new truck, and a used passenger automobile to a new
passenger automobile.9 3 An automobile is designed primarily for
transportation of people, while the principal purpose of a truck is
moving inanimate objects. Since the vehicle clause does not differen-
tiate between types of trucks, all trucks presumably are like kind.
9 4
Hence a pickup is like kind to a weapons carrier or a semi-trailer.
Since the vehicle clause does not distinguish between types of
automobiles, all automobiles presumably are like kind.95 Thus a
Chevette is a like kind to a Corvette or a Cobra. Some vehicles do
not clearly fall into either category. A Volkswagen bus has seating
for nine passengers. Deletion of most of the seats and a few other
minor changes converts a bus into a transporter. Station wagons and
vans are similar all-purpose vehicles. There is no apparent reason for
88. Id.
89. See infra text accompanying notes 144-46.
90. Treas. Reg. 62, art. 1566(a) (1921), reprinted in 136 INTERNAL REVENUE
AcTs oF 1909-1950.
91. T.D. 2468, reprinted in II-1 C.B. 27 (1923).
92. Treas. Reg. 86, art. 112(b)(1)-I (1934), reprinted in 140 INTERNAL REVENUE
AcTs oF 1909-1950.
93. Id. See also infra text accompanying 114-30.
94. E.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(d)-1(b) e.g. (1967) (a moving truck for a truck);
North Shore Bus Co. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C.M. (P-H) 127 (1943), a ffd, 143 F.2d 114
(2d Cir. 1944) (an Old Yellow parlor car (bus) for a Model 40-R Twin Motor Coach
(bus)).
95. E.g., Thomas Goggan & Bros. v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 218, 224-25 (1941)
(a Chrysler for a Buick).
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differentiating between types of motor vehicles. Regardless of
whether the vehicle is an automobile, a truck, or a hybrid, the owner
has an investment in an asset designed to provide transportation.
The treatment of movables was not changed from 1939 to 1954.
The 1954 regulation added a boot example which concludes that a
moving truck and a truck are like kind.9" Hence the motor vehicle
examples are the only coverage of exchanges of movables in the cur-
rent regulations. The 1934 example is so bland that it has not been
seriously challenged in fifty-two years.
Boot
The treatment of cash and other unqualified property has gone
through several stages. The first boot statute was part of the reor-
ganization material enacted in 1918. The statute provided for non-
recognition of gain or loss if the value of the stock or securities re-
ceived by a shareholder did not exceed the value of the stock or
securities he gave up.9 7 Gain was recognized to the extent the value
of the stock or securities a person received exceeded the value of the
stock or securities he gave up.98 A shareholder who received cash or
property other than stock or securities recognized all of his gain.9
Like kind exchanges were added to the list of nonrecognition
transactions in 1921. In response to a question during Finance Com-
mittee hearings, Adams indicated the need for a boot rule for like
kind exchanges. Several days later, he suggested that gain should be
recognized to the extent that boot exceeded basis. 100 Congress ac-
cepted the Adams suggestion.' 0' People took advantage of the oppor-
tunity to obtain tax-free cash at the cost of a basis reduction, and
early in 1923 emergency legislation was hastily enacted to end the
practice. 10 2 A person who received boot was treated as if he had sold
property, and gain was recognized to the extent it was matched by
boot. The new rule was retroactive to January 1, 1923, and is still in
96. E.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(d)-l(e) (1967).
97. Revenue Act of 1918, § 202(b).
98. Id.
99. Treas. Reg. 45, arts. 1567, 1569 (1918), reprinted in 134 INTERNAL REVENUE
AcTs OF 1909-1950; Tex-Penn Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 28 B.T.A. 917 (1933), rev'd on
other grounds, 83 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1936), affid, 300 U.S. 481 (1937).
100. Revenue Act of 1921: Hearings on H.R. 8245 Before the Senate Finance
Comm., 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 28, 203 (1921) (statement of Dr. T.S. Adams, Tax Advi-
sor, Department of Treasury).
101. Revenue Act of 1921, § 202(b).
102. See infra text accompanying notes 467-68.
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force.10 3
Application of the boot rule is not consistent. Sometimes an actual
receipt of boot is ignored. One type of case involves people who are
obligated to use cash in a specified manner,104 or who are being re-
imbursed for an expenditure.105 No boot is deemed received in those
cases. Boot is received, however, in cases in which people receive
property subject to indebtedness and cash, if they may use the cash
in any manner they choose.106 In a 1980 opinion which was officially
reported, the Tax Court concluded that the results were proper be-
cause in the latter case there was no restriction on the way the per-
son used the cash.10 7 That line of reasoning is not supported by gen-
eral tax principles. A person who receives cash and agrees to pay an
obligation has borrowed money regardless of whether the obligation
is recourse or nonrecourse. A borrower is not ordinarily taxed on
receiving the proceeds of a loan.108 There is no apparent reason for a
different treatment of the loan portion of a like kind exchange. In-
vestigation has not identified any other context where a borrower is
taxed when a loan is created.
In other cases, boot is present even though a person does not seem
to receive anything. A person who is relieved from a personal liabil-
ity receives the transferee's promise to pay. Nonrecourse indebted-
ness is a different situation. Since no personal liability existed, the
person does not receive anything which satisfies an accepted defini-
tion of money or property. The Supreme Court, however, has con-
cluded that relief from nonrecourse indebtedness does result in re-
ceipt of money or property.109 The amount realized is the face value
of the debt. 110
The 1954 regulation added several boot examples. A typical fac-
tual pattern involves giving up real estate for other real estate, cash,
103. Act of Mar. 4, 1923, ch. 294, § 2, 42 Stat. 1560 (1923). S. REP No. 1113,
67th Cong., 4th Sess. 1, reprinted in 1939-1 (pt. 2) C.B. 845.
104. North Shore Bus Co. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C.M. (P-H) 127, (1943), aff'd,
143 F. 2d. 114 (2d Cir. 1944); 124 Front St., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 6, 15-18
(1975), acq. and nonacq., 1976-2 C.B. 2-3.
105. Biggs v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 905, 916-17 (1978), affd, 632 F.2d 1171
(5th Cir. 1980); Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 497, 605-24
(1980), subsequent proceedings on another issue, 82 T.C. 122 (1984).
106. Coleman v. Commissioner, 18 T.C.M. (P-H) 299 (1949), afid, 180 F.2d 758
(8th Cir. 1950); Behrens v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) 829 (1985), aft'd, 786 F.2d
1170 (8th Cir. 1986). Compare Barker v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 555, 570 (1980), with
124 Front St., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 6, 18 (1975).
107. Barker v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 555, 570 (1980). Compare Greene v. Com-
missioner, 85 T.C. 571, 573-74 (1985).
108. E.g., Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 309-10 (1983).
109. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
110. Id. See I.R.C. § 1031(d) (1986); Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt
and the Crane Case, 33 TAx L. REv. 277, 278 (1978).
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and an automobile."' The example illustrates operation of the rule
for apportioning basis between properties received. A second factual
pattern involves giving up an apartment building subject to a mort-
gage for another apartment building subject to a mortgage and
cash."a The example deals with assumption of liabilities and other
computational details. The position of a person who both gives up
and receives unqualified property is considered in the discussion of
netting.
Reverse Boot
The boot rules apply to a person who receives unqualified prop-
erty. A person who gives up unqualified property has paid reverse
boot. Reverse boot is a common feature of trade-in transactions. 113
From 1909 to 1927 the IRS felt that a trade-in was not a closed
transaction. Hence the result was the same regardless of whether the
transaction was covered by the like kind statute, the exchange regu-
lation, or occurred under an earlier revenue act."4 The administra-
tive position and the like kind statute were not consistently asserted
by the government. In a 1927 opinion which was officially reported,
the Board allowed a deduction for a loss on a 1920 trade-in of vehi-
cles.""5 Although the decision failed to mention the exchange regula-
tion, the IRS announced agreement in 1931.11" A pair of 1927 rul-
ings applied the reverse boot rule under the like kind statute to an
exchange of oil leases, and a trade-in of motor vehicles. 17 In a 1928
decision which was officially reported, the Board allowed a deduction
for a loss on a 1921 vehicle trade-in." 8 Although the opinion did not
111. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(d)-l(c) (1967). Other examples of the same type in-
volve: (1) real estate for other real estate and cash, and (2) a moving truck for a truck
and cash. Treas. Reg. §§ l.1031(b)-l(b), 1.1031(d)-l(b) (1967).
112. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(d)-2 e.g. (2) (1956). The other example of this type
involves an apartment building subject to mortgage for another apartment building and
cash. Id. (I).
113. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031-1(c) (1967).
114. See Announcement, fourth item on page under art. 141, VII-1 C.B. 231
(1928).
115. Cooper-Brannan Naval Stores Co. v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 105 (1927),
acq., X-1 C.B. 14 (1931). See Caliifornia Delta Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A.
1301 (1927), acq., VII-I C.B. 5 (1928).
116. Cooper-Brannan, 9 B.T.A. at 105.
117. G.C.M. 1090, VI-1 C.B. 240 (1927) (oil leases), declared obsolete without
replacement, Rev. Rul. 67-123, 1967-1 C.B. 383; I.T. 2356, VI-1 C.B. 168 (1927) (vehi-
cles), revoked, I.T. 2419, VII-1 C.B. 231 (1928), reinstated, I.T. 2573, X-1 C.B. 215
(1931), declared obsolete without replacement, Rev. Rul. 67-446, 1967-2 C.B. 427.
118. Kay v. Commissioner, 10 B.T.A. 534 (1928), acq., VII-1 C.B. 17 (1928).
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cite the like kind statute, the IRS promptly announced agreement. 119
In addition, the IRS revoked the 1927 vehicle ruling, and issued an-
other ruling which concluded that a trade-in plus cash was a sale.
Hence the transaction was closed and realized gain or loss was rec-
ognized. 120 Because the oil lease ruling was not disturbed, the IRS
apparently felt a distinction was justified. Hindsight does not suggest
a viable distinction, and there is no record indicating what the IRS
had in mind. People were not always vigilant in their dealings with
the government. In a 1929 opinion which was officially reported, the
Board concluded that gain was recognized on a 1920 trade-in of ve-
hicles,1 21 The opinion did not mention the exchange regulation.
The turning point was a 1930 decision which involved a person
who traded in a printing press and related items. In an opinion
which was officially reported, the Board applied the like kind statute.
Although the person gave up cash, the court concluded that no gain
was recognized because the property received was solely in kind to
the property traded in. The IRS promptly announced agreement
with the decision,1 22 and reinstated the 1927 vehicle ruling. Thereaf-
ter, the statute was regularly asserted and consistently applied.1 23 In
1934 there was another judicial explanation for the reverse boot di-
gression from the solely requirement. A person who paid cash was
purchasing an additional investment in the like kind property.2
The confusion prompted the Treasury to include trade-in examples
in the 1934 regulation . 25 An analysis based on the purpose for the
boot rule leads to the conclusion that the example is justified. A per-
son who receives boot is treated as if he had sold property, and gain
is recognized to the extent it is matched by the boot.126 The example
establishes a reverse boot rule. If as a part of an otherwise like kind
exchange a person gives up cash, he has increased his investment in
like kind property. Because a person who uses cash to purchase prop-
erty does not realize gain or loss, there is no logical reason why the
119. Id.
120. I.T. 2419, VII-I C.B. 231 (1928), Mim. 3614, VII-I C.B. 86 (1928), re-
voked, I.T. 2573, X-I C.B. 215 (1931), declared obsolete without replacement, Rev.
Rul. 67-446, 1967-2 C.B. 427.
121. Ies Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 376 (1929).
122. W.H. Hartman Co. v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 302 (1930), acq., X-I C.B.
27 (1931).
123. E.g., National Outdoor Advertising Bureau, Inc. v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A.
1025 (1935), nonacq. on another issue, 1939-2 C.B. 60, affid, 89 F.2d 878 (2d Cir.
1937), remanded on another issue, 7 B.T.A. Mem. (P-H) 393 (1938).
124. Hamilton v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 160 (1934). Hamilton applied the rea-
soning on appeal of a reorganization case which was governed by a statute with an iden-
tical "solely" requirement. Securities Co. v. Commissioner, 25 B.T.A. 446 (1932), acq.,
X-I C.B. 6 (1932), rev'd, 64 F.2d 330 (2d Cir. 1933).
125. Treas. Reg. 86, art. 112(b)(l)-1 (1934), reprinted in 140 INTERNAL REVENUE
AcTs oF 1909-1950.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 80-83.
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purchase feature of an otherwise like kind exchange should cause a
different result. Attractive as that reasoning may be it will not stand
analysis. An exchange does not qualify under the general rule unless
the transaction consists solely of like kind properties. There are two
exceptions to the solely requirement. The boot rule provides for lim-
ited recognition of gain, and no recognition of loss. 1217 When a statute
establishes a general rule and at least one exception, Congress is pre-
sumed to have considered and rejected other possible exceptions.
Hence the general rule is not to be interpreted to create any other
exception. 128 The reverse boot rule may have obtained the force of
law by tacit congressional approval through reenactment of the
statute.1
29
The 1954 regulation added a reverse boot example which involves
giving up real estate and stock for real estate. The example illus-
trates recognition of losses and other aspects of reverse boot.1 30
Netting
The consequences of receiving boot sometimes are modified by
netting. Netting may be justified by several explanations. A person
receives boot only to the extent he receives more unqualified property
than he gave up. That explanation was offered in a 1927 ruling on
an exchange of properties subject to mortgage debts, and followed in
a similar 1959 ruling. 3 A person who receives property for a pay-
ment of cash13 2 or an agreement to pay money in the future1 33 has
purchased property. A purchaser who agrees to pay in the future is
also a borrower.1 34 If a purchase, or purchase and loan, by itself
would be tax-free the same event as part of an exchange transaction
should produce the same result.13 5
127. E.g., Revenue Act of 1924, §§ 203(d)(1) (boot gain), 203(0 (boot loss);
I.R.C. §§ 1031(b) (boot gain), 1031(c), (boot loss) (1986).
128. E.g., Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prod., Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944); Andrus v.
Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608 (1980). See generally 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND ON
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.11 (4th ed. 1984).
129. Compare Commissioner v. Noel, 380 U.S. 678 (1965), with Helvering v. Sab-
ine Transp. Co., 318 U.S. 306 (1943); Smietanka v. First Trust & Say. Bank, 257 U.S.
602, 605-06 (1922); Max Sobel Wholesale Liquors v. Commissioner, 630 F.2d 670, 672
(9th Cir. 1980), followed Rev. Rul. 82-149, 1982-2 C.B. 56.
130. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(d)-l(e) (1967).
131. G.C.M. 2641, VI-2 C.B. 16 (1927), declared obsolete without replacement,
Rev. Rul. 69-31, 1969-1 C.B. 307; Rev. Rul. 59-229, 1959-2 C.B. 180.
132. Carroll Furniture Co. v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1952).
133. Todd v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (P-H) 1233 (1966).
134. 1 B. BITTKER, supra note 38, at 6.2.
135. See Hamilton v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 160 (1934); Winter Holding Corp.
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Desirable as the net approach may be, it will not stand analysis
because it permits treating unqualified properties as if they were like
kind properties. Indebtedness cannot be like kind property, and the
amount realized from debt relief is the face amount of the obliga-
tion. Because the fact that the obligation is worth less than face
amount is disregarded, undertaking another obligation does not look
like an acceptable excuse for reducing the amount realized.
The net approach is not applied in a consistent manner. The regu-
lation covers five of nine possible combinations, and rulings address
two others. Perhaps the government feels the answers are self-evi-
dent in the remaining situations. Debt relief is offset by payment of
cash, assumption of debt, or disposition of other property. Receipt of
cash is offset by payment in cash. Receipt of cash is not offset by a
payment of other property or assumption of indebtedness. Receipt of
other property is offset by a payment of cash. Receipt of other prop-
erty is not offset by assumption of debt or disposition of other prop-
erty. 136 There is no apparent justification for the inconsistent
results.137
v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 1185 (1935). Cf. Behrens v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-
H) 829, 834-36 (1985), affd 786 F.2d 1170 (8th Cir. 1986).
136. In tabular form, the combinations, results and authorities are:
OFFSET
DISPOSED OF RECEIVED AUTHORITY
Debt Assumed Debt Relief 1.1031(d)-2 e.g. (2)(b)
Cash Debt Relief 1.1031(d)-2 e.g. (2)(c)
Other Property Debt Relief 1.1031(d)-2 e.g. (2)(c)
Cash Cash Rev. Rul. 72-456, 1972-2 C.B. 468
Cash Other Property None. See explanatory note.
NO OFFSET
DISPOSED OF RECEIVED AUTHORITY
Debt Assumed Cash 1.1031(d)-2 e.g. (2)(b, c)
Other Property Cash None. See explanatory note.
Debt Assumed Other Property 1.1031(d)-2 e.g. (2)(c)
Other Property Other Property Rev. Rul. 59-229, 1959-2 C.B. 180
Explanatory note: Presumably, general tax principles apply in situations not covered by a
published authority. Receipt of other property is offset by cash paid because purchasing
property ordinarily is tax-free. Receipt of cash is not offset by a disposition of property
because selling property is taxable.
137. Barker v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 555, 569-72 (1980). Note, Boot Netting
Under I.R.C. § 1031, Barker v. Commissioiner, 74 T.C. 555 (1980), 12 RUTGERS L. REv.
793 (1980); Behrens v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) 829, 834-36 (1985), affd 786
F.2d 1170 (8th Cir. 1986). See Sayre v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 495, 498-99 (S.D.
W. Va. 1958). See generally Comment, A Substance-Oriented Approach to the Boot-
Netting Rules Under Section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code: Biggs v. Commis-
sioner, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REv. 427.
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Construction of the Regulations
The term like kind was created by the Treasury. The first use of
the term was in 1921 when the Treasury proposed a like kind stat-
ute. The proposal was enacted after extremely limited considera-
tion.138 The task of publishing rules or standards was delegated to
the Treasury.
The 1921 regulation was suspect because it contained inconsistent
statements.13 9 Perhaps the Treasury was in a hurry and did not care-
fully consider the material. Another possibility is that those in
charge of drafting the like kind provision did not receive adequate
guidance. Adams generally is accepted as the father of the 1921 Act,
and he presumably influenced the 1921 like kind regulation. He was
an economist who appears long on ideas and short on implementa-
tion. Property other than land, stocks, and evidence of indebtedness
do not seem to have been sufficiently important to demand attention
by Adams or the Treasury. 40 Post-1921 changes in the regulations
are of little or no consequence to a search for a general understand-
ing of the term like kind.141
The Treasury was unable or unwilling to provide a definition for
the term like kind. In addition to employing words which were not
helpful, the Treasury appears to have adopted the common-law dis-
tinction between land and movables. There never has been a serious
effort to systematically compare and classify properties. The com-
mon law was typically concerned with ownership of interests in prop-
erty or injury to property.142 The usual remedies were money dam-
ages, or specific performance of an agreement.1 43 Because the
general law is not likely to undertake comparisons of properties, de-
termining characters appears more like a matter of philosophy.
Adams was the person who supplied most of the Treasury philoso-
phy in 1921.144 The evidence suggests that if an investment contin-
ued in an illiquid asset such as land, the Treasury was willing to live
with differences which were bound to arise. Movables, however, were
another matter. They were mentioned for the sole purpose of distin-
138. See supra text accompanying note 39.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 88-91; Treas. Reg. 62, art. 1566(a)
(1921), reprinted in 136 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF 1909-1950.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 77-85, 93-96.
142. See 5A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1143, 1145 (1964); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY §§ 8.105, 10.9 (A. Casner ed. 1952); 6A id. § 28.12 (A. Casner ed. 1954).
143. See 5A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1143, 1145.
144. See supra text accompanying note 12.
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guishing them from land. Hence the Treasury did not offer a positive
approach to movables generally. It is easy to conclude that the Trea-
sury was unable to formulate a satisfactory general classification for
movables. Supposing that Congress intended a broad standard for
land and no standard for movables seems absurd. The Treasury did
offer a distinction between stock and evidence of indebtedness.
145
That distinction was rejected because the classification was inappro-
priately narrow. 46
The Treasury and the IRS experienced difficulty with creative re-
organizations. The initial approaches were to withhold advance ap-
proval of proposed deals and to reject claims for favorable treatment
of completed transactions. In 1934 Congress was concerned with re-
ducing tax avoidance. The House report gave enthusiastic approval
to court decisions requiring compliance with the terms and underly-
ing purpose of the reorganization statutes.1 47 The approval en-
couraged the Treasury to impose a purpose limit on most nonrecog-
nition exchanges. The substance of the 1934 strict construction rule
appears in the current regulations.14 8
Treasury regulations are to "be sustained unless unreasonable or
inconsistent with the statute. 14 9 Under the strict construction regu-
lation, the replacement property must substantially continue an in-
vestment. Hence differences between the properties must be more
formal than substantial. The facts and circumstances surrounding a
transaction must be examined to determine whether the exchange
satisfies the express terms and underlying assumptions of a nonrec-
ognition statute.150 The IRS does not have a good batting average in
like kind cases where the strict construction regulation is cited in the
opinion. The government won seven, and people prevailed in six, and
one was a split decision. In a 1979 opinion, the Ninth Circuit ob-
served that "[i]f the regulation purports to read into section 1031 a
complex web of formal and substantive requirements, precedent indi-
cates decisively that the regulation has been rejected . . . . We
therefore analyze the. . . transaction with the courts' permissive at-
titude towards section 1031 in mind."1 ''
145. Treas. Reg. 62, art. 1566(a) (1921), reprinted in 136 INTERNAL REVENUE
AcTs OF 1909-1950.
146. See supra text accompanying note 69.
147. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt.
2) C.B. 564.
148. Treas. Reg. 86, art 112(a)-I (1934), reprinted in 140 INTERNAL REVENUE
ACTS OF 1909-1950; Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(b), (e) (1960).
149. E.g., Fawcus Mach. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375, 378 (1931).
150. Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(b), (c) (1960).
151. Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1352-53 (9th Cir. 1979) (land for
an agreement to either convey land or cash within five years). In addition to Starker,
people prevailed in Sayre v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 495 (S.D. W. Va. 1958) (farms
were exchanged); City Inv. Co. & Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 1 (1962),
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The presumption of correctness has added force where the statute
was drafted by members of the administration charged with enforc-
ing it because Congress is presumed to have accepted their interpre-
tation in passing the statute.152 The additional weight has not been
enough in several cases involving rules announced by the 1921 regu-
lation. A series of decisions reject the distinction between stocks and
evidence of indebtedness.1 53 In a 1983 opinion which was reviewed,
the Tax Court rejected the distinction between land and movables.
The decision was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit.1 54
Continuity of Investment
The term investment has two meanings for like kind purposes.
One is the requirement that a person hold property given up and
property received for productive use in trade or business, or for in-
vestment.15 5 The other is the suggestion that an exchange must re-
sult in continuation of an investment.
1 56
The continuity approach arose in the Civil War and survived to
nonacq., 1963-1 C.B. 5 (land for leaseback); Leslie Co. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 247,
252 (1975), nonacq., 1978-2 C.B. 3, affid, 539 F.2d 943, 947-49 (3d Cir. 1976) (land for
leaseback); Crowley, Milner & Co. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 1031, 1035-38 (1981),
affid, 689 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1982) (land for leaseback); Magneson v. Commissioner, 81
T.C. 767, 769-73 (1983), affid, 753 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1985) (land immediately recon-
veyed for interest in partnership). The government prevailed in Bloomington Coco-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 14 (7th Cir. 1951) (old building and cash for
new building to be constructed was a sale); Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S.
260 (1958) (temporary transfer of an interest in an oil lease was an assignment of in-
come); Badgett v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 120 (W.D. Ky. 1959) (modification of a
coal mining lease arrangement was not an exchange of like kind properties); Black v.
Commissioner, 35 T.C. 90, 94 (1960) (land held primarily for resale); Bernard v. Com-
missioner, 36 T.C.M. (P-H) 939, 942-43 (1967) (land held primarily for resale); Godine
v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (P-H) 1589, 1591 (1977) (motive for exchange not rele-
vant); Behrens v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) 829, 832 (1985), affd, 786 F.2d 1170
(8th Cir. 1986) (cash loan was boot). A split decision occurred in Meyer v. Commis-
sioner, 58 T.C. 311 (1972) (partnership interests), nonacq., 1975-1 C.B. 3, a ffd on one
issue per curiam, 503 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1974).
152. See Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 HARV. L. REV.
398, 404-11 (1941).
153. See cases cited supra note 69; see also Girard Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 16
B.T.A. 308 (1928) (stock for bonds), nonacq., VIII-2 C.B. 63 (1929); Simmons v. Com-
missioner, 32 B.T.A. 320 (1935) (common participation shares in a business trust for
common stock and preferred stock), acq., XIV-I C.B. 18 (1935); Castell v. United
States, 20 F. Supp. 175, 179 (S.D. N.Y. 1937) (stock for bonds and government obliga-
tions), rev'd on other grounds, 98 F.2d 88 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 652 (1938).
154. Magneson v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 767, 769-73 (1983), affd, 753 F.2d
1490 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Pappus v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1078, 1088 (1982).
155. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(a) (1967).
156. Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(b), (e) (1960).
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the present day.157 The first Treasury application of the doctrine to a
nonrecognition statute was by the 1924 reorganization regulation.
Although the clause was continued in 1926, it did not appear in
1928 regulation.1 58 The Treasury revived the doctrine when it
adopted the 1934 strict construction regulation, which was applica-
ble to most nonrecognition statutes. The 1934 version was continued
without substantial modification and is included in the current
regulation.159
Continuity of investment has little or no legislative support. The
doctrine was not mentioned when the like kind provision was
adopted in 1921, and there is no reference to the doctrine at any
time when the statute was amended. The doctrine was mentioned as
one of the reasons for not repealing the reorganization rules in 1934.
While that might constitute legislative support for applying the doc-
trine in some reorganization situations, there is no evidence of a con-
gressional desire to have the doctrine applied under the like kind
statute.160 The only apparent justification for a rule of general appli-
cation was a Treasury desire for another weapon to combat tax
avoidance.
The IRS has searched for legislative support. Presumably because
nothing better could be found, the IRS focused on the legislative
history of the different sex statute. Although the context makes it
clear that the remarks are addressed solely to livestock of different
sexes, the IRS has applied investment difference language to a broad
range of properties. In a 1978 opinion which was officially reported,
the Tax Court seemed to reject the argument out of hand. 6 While
considering what to do about the decision, the IRS prepared a memo
which concluded that land is land regardless of arguable differences
and promptly announced agreement with the decision. 6 2 Perhaps the
IRS will not pursue the doctrine in situations which involve diverse
interests in land. The IRS has been more successful in cases involv-
ing movables. In a 1983 opinion, the Ninth Circuit accepted the live-
stock language as evidence of a strict construction approach for mov-
ables generally, and concluded that the Swiss francs were not like
kind to gold coins. Several rulings apply the livestock language to
157. See supra text accompanying notes 5-8.
158. Treas. Reg. 65, art. 1574 (1924); Treas. Reg. 69, art. 1574 (1926), both re-
printed in 137 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF 1909-1950.
159. Treas. Reg. 86, art. 112(a)-I (1934), reprinted in 140 INTERNAL REVENUE
ACTS OF 1909-1950; Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(b), (c) (1960). See generally Fellows, The
Emerging "Continuity of Investment" Doctrine for Like-Kind Exchanges Under Section
1031, 38 TAX EXECUTIVE 33 (1985).
160. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1934), reprinted in 1939-1
(pt.2) C.B. 563-64.
161. Koch v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 54 (1978), Action on Decision: CC 1979-86
(May 16, 1979), acq., 1979-1 C.B. 1.
162. Id.
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precious metals and coins. One author has observed that the rulings
fail to state "which type is masculine and which feminine. "163
Reducing uncertainty is one of the goals of the like kind statute.
Comparing investment details increases uncertainty. Letters issued
in 1980 and 1981 compared investments and concluded that gold
bullion was like kind to silver bullion.164 After the difference in mar-
kets was pointed out, a 1982 ruling concluded the properties were
not like kind.165 There is no apparent like kind difference between
gold and silver, and attempting to create one introduces the sort of
uncertainty Congress wanted to avoid.
The treatment of short-term leases is even more remarkable. The
1924 regulation announced that a lease of a fee with at least thirty
years to run was like kind to land. Today that rule seems to have the
force of law.16 6 The Treasury, however, has remained silent about
short-term leases. A short-term lease may be an investment for like
kind purposes.8 7 Several officially reported Tax Court opinions have
concluded that short-term leases are not like kind to land.168 The test
for ascertaining whether properties are like kind is strikingly similar
to one of the conditions for a qualified replacement of involuntarily
converted property. Under the involuntary conversion statute, the
properties must have a similar nature."6 9 In 1951 Congress received
proposals to broaden the involuntary conversion statute. The Chair-
man of the Ways and Means Committee observed that to permit a
person "to defer gain while changing the nature of his investment
would be a serious departure from the policy of existing law
.... ,7 In a 1937 opinion which was reviewed, the Board con-
cluded that land was a qualified replacement for a ten year lease.17,
The IRS promptly announced agreement with the decision. Rulings
163. 2 B. BITTKER, supra note 38, at 44-12 n.ll.
164. LTR 8020107 (Feb. 25, 1980); LTR 8128102 (Apr. 20, 1981).
165. Rev. Rul. 82-166, 1982-2 C.B. 190.
166. E.g., McShain v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 154, 162 (1977), subsequent pro-
ceedings on another issue, 71 T.C. 998 (1979).
167. Rev. Rul. 76-301, 1976-2 C.B. 241.
168. Standard Envelope Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 41 (1950), acq., 1950-
2 C.B. 4; May Dep't Stores Co. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 547 (1951), acq. on other
issues, 1951-2 C.B. 3; Capri, Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 162, 181-82 (1975).
169. For example, compare supra text accompanying note 77 with S. REP. No.
1938, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1958), reprinted in 1958-3 C.B. 992 and in 61 CONG.
REC. 5201 (Aug. 18, 1921) (statement of Rep. Hawley).
170. 97 CONG. REC. 10348 (Aug. 20, 1951) (statement of Rep. Doughton).
171. Davis Regulator Co. v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 437 (1937), acq., 1937-2
C.B. 7; I.T. 3793, 1946-1 C.B. 96, declared obsolete without replacement, Rev. Rul. 69-
45, 1969-1 C.B. 313; Rev. Rul. 83-70, 1983-1 C.B. 189.
1093
issued in 1946 and 1983 reach the same conclusion. 172 Trying to as-
certain why short-term leases are not given the same treatment
under the like kind statute is similar to playing a shell game. Deci-
sions which lack conspicuous consistency do not satisfy the congres-
sional goal of reducing uncertainty.
Congress rejected the continuity approach to the like kind statute.
In 1924 the Treasury proposed making like kind the sole criterion
for comparing properties and suggested there should be no distinc-
tion between productive use in a trade or business and investment.
The changes were designed to deal with a controversy which arose
from Treasury inconsistencies. The Treasury observed that the stat-
ute would not operate fairly if distinctions between productive use
and investment were permitted. Congress accepted the fairness ob-
servation. 17 3 It is implicit that business applications are not to be
compared, and that investments are not to be compared. Hence the
continuity approach is improper.
LAND
Introduction
The compatibility of land items depends on the purpose of an in-
quiry. In an action for breach of land contract, equity usually will
conclude that the parcel is unique.174 Land items are sometimes
deemed comparable where value is the issue for purposes such as
casualty losses, eminent domain, and property taxation. 75 Relevancy
is the criterion for determining the admissibility of evidence support-
ing an attempted comparison. 176 Evidence has been rejected in cases
in which the property was unique,17 7 and when there was no compa-
rable property in the jurisdiction."7 " If evidence is admitted, the
question is the weight to be given to the evidence. 7 9 The number of
factors which have been considered may exceed the imagination of
mankind. 80 Comparing items for like kind purposes is the opposite
extreme. Regardless of arguable differences, each tract is like kind to
172. Id.
173. Statement of the Changes Made in the Revenue Act of 1921 by the Treasury
Draft and the Reasons Therefore 11-12, reprinted in 66 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF
1909-1950; S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1924), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt. 2)
C.B. 276.
174. See supra text accompanying note 11.
175. See generally J. BONBRIGHT, THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY (1937).
176. 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 462 (1979).
177. E.g., Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Tax Comm., 14 N.Y.2d 314, 200
N.E.2d 447, 251 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1964).
178. E.g., Deere Mfg. Co. v. Zeiner, 247 Iowa 1364, 1375-76, 78 N.W.2d 527,
534 (1956).
179. 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 176 § 462.
180. Smith, Issues and Problems in the Valuation of Real Estate, 30 N.Y.U. TAX
INST. 209 (1972). See generally I J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 175, at 362-510.
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every other tract.""'
Equating all items of land was the intent of Congress. The goals
expressed by Congress and the Treasury included reducing uncer-
tainty and encouraging business adjustments. 182 During the 1921 Fi-
nance Committee hearings, Adams was asked for examples of quali-
fied properties. He felt that a factory was like kind to another
factory.183 Regulations from 1921 to the present clearly indicate that
arguable differences in land items have no bearing on whether they
are like kind.18 4 Hence it is clear that the Treasury and Congress did
not want to leave room for debate about whether land items are suf-
ficiently comparable.
State Law
The effect of state law is unclear. State law identifies property
subject to ownership and the extent of ownership interests. 85 There
are several approaches to classifying property as land or a movable.
Some authorities follow state law, 8 ' others misconstrue it, 187 still
others offer excuses for not applying it,188 and another group ignores
it.189 A series of approaches to state law does not satisfy the congres-
sional goal of reducing uncertainty.
Physical Properties
An ambitious list would identify a large number of ways to com-
pare items of land. Like kind approaches can be categorized as in-
volving economic, location, or physical characteristics. The physical
characteristics of land are not relevant. Unimproved land is like kind
to improved land, and one case compares a hotel to oil, gas, and
181. See infra text accompanying notes 190-98.
182. See supra text accompanying note 8.
183. See supra text accompanying note 49.
184. E.g., Treas. Reg. 62, art. 1566(a) (1921), reprinted in 136 INTERNAL REVE-
NUE ACTS OF 1909-1950; Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-l(c)(2) (1967).
185. E.g., Rev. Rul. 55-749, 1955-2 C.B. 295; Magneson v. Commissioner, 81 T.C.
767 (1983), afi'd, 753 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1985).
186. E.g., Oregon Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 192 (1953), acq., 1953-2
C.B. 5; M.H.S. Co. v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (P-H) 721, 732-35 (1976), affid per
curiam, 575 F.2d 1177 (6th Cir. 1978).
187. See generally Ronce, Land and Improvements are Definitely Not "Like
Kind" (Are They?), 61 TAXES 382 (1983). See also Rev. Rul. 76-390, 1976-2 C.B. 243.
188. E.g., Rev. Rul. 68-226, 1968-1 C.B. 362, applied by Rev. Rul. 68-331, 1968-
1 C.B. 352.
189. E.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(c)(1) (1967); Pappas v. Commissioner, 78
T.C. 1078, 1088 (1982); Magneson v. Commissioner, 753 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1985). See
Rev. Rul. 72-85, 1972-1 C.B. 234.
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other minerals in the ground. 190 In a 1941 opinion, the Fifth Circuit
observed that a dissimilarity in attributes is not pertinent to classifi-
cation and concluded the properties were like kind.' The IRS has
regularly applied the hotel case in situations where mineral interests
are exchanged for items such as ranches.
92
The IRS has not come to grips with the attributes principle in
situations which do not involve minerals. A 1979 memorandum con-
cludes that land is land regardless of apparent dissimilarities.' 9 3 The
memorandum did not signal a general change in IRS attitude. One
ruling concluded that city railroad tracks and facilities were not like
kind to replacement tracks and facilities located on a bypass around
the city.194 The IRS may have based its findings on the fact that the
new track caused elimination of numerous street crossings. One case
involved facts which did not appear to be materially different from
those facts set forth in the ruling. In a 1980 opinion which was re-
viewed, the Tax Court observed that the ruling did not elaborate a
legal basis for the finding and held that the properties were like
kind. 9
5
Likewise, the location of land is not relevant. Urban land is like
kind to rural land, land items located in different states are like kind,
and domestic land is like kind to foreign land.9 6 One case compared
a city house and undeveloped land in a mangrove swamp.197 In a
1930 opinion which was officially reported, the Board observed that
discussion was unnecessary and concluded that the properties were
like kind." 8 The IRS promptly announced agreement with the
decision.' 99
Economic considerations are also not relevant. The fact that a per-
son made a good or bad bargain and changed from one approved use
to another does not affect the classification of land. In one case, a
person held undeveloped land for investment, and operated a golf
course and clubhouse business at another location.2 00 Both parcels
were exchanged for land subject to long-term condominium leases
190. Commissioner v. Crichton, 122 F.2d 181, 182 (5th Cir. 1941).
191. Id.
192. E.g., Rev. Rul. 68-331, 1968-1 C.B. 352; LTR 8135048 (June 3, 1981).
193. Action on Decision CC: 1979-86 (May 16, 1979).
194. Rev. Rul. 57-450, 1957-2 C.B. 137.
195. Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 497, 619 n.138 (1980),
subsequent proceeding on other issues, 82 T.C. 122 (1984).
196. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(c)(2) (1967); Biggs v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 905 (1978),
affd, 632 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980); Rev. Rul. 68-363, 1968-2 C.B. 336.
197. Biscayne Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 1015, 1017-18, 1021 (1930),
acq., IX-2 C.B. 6 (1930).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Koch v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 54, 66, 68-69 (1978), Action on Decision CC:
1979-86 (May 16, 1979), acq., 1979-1 C.B. 1.
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and the leases themselves. IRS argued the properties were unalike
because the leases provided a stream of income. In a 1978 opinion
which was officially reported, the Tax Court observed that dissimi-
larities in capacities for profitable use were not factors for discussion
and concluded that the properties were like kind. While considering
the decision, the IRS observed that land is land regardless of appar-
ent differences, and promptly announced agreement with the
decision.201
Ownership Interests
Property is a broad term which covers things capable of ownership
and interests which the law will protect.20 2 A person who exchanges
land is not entitled to like kind treatment unless he has an adequate
relationship to each property. The existence and extent of an owner-
ship interest are state law qulestions.03
Most decisions are preoccupied with the time during which an in-
terest may continue. In one case, a person gave up an oil payment
and received a ranch. After the transferee had received a fixed sum
of money, his interest would expire and the right to receive payments
would revert to the person. 0 4 Like kind treatment was denied be-
cause one interest was permanent and the other was temporary.205
Temporary and permanent interests are distinguished by their po-
tential duration. For example, the life expectancy of an owner is not
a factor to be considered unless it affects the continuation of an in-
terest. In one ruling, a widow exchanged remainder interests with
her children. The IRS indicated life expectancy was not relevant and
concluded that the items of land were like kind.206 Under the regula-
tions, a leasehold of a fee is equivalent to a fee interest if the lease-
hold has at least thirty years to run.207 The term of the lease in-
cludes all renewal periods. The thirty year rule has been extended to
other interests. A life estate is a permanent interest if the actuarial
expectancy of the measuring life is at least thirty years.20 a An estate
201. Koch, 71 T.C. at 66, 68-69.
202. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 87, at 167-68.
203. E.g., Magneson v. Commissioner, 753 F.2d 1490, 1495-98 (9th Cir. 1985).
204. Fleming v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 818 (1955), revd on this issue, 241 F.2d
78 (5th Cir. 1957), Circuit Court rev'd and Tax Court affid on this issue sub nom.
Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 268 (1958).
205. Id.
206. Rev. Rul. 78-4, 1978-1 C.B. 256. See Wagensen v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.
653, 654-60 (1980).
207. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031-1(c) (1967).
208. Rev. Rul. 72-601, 1972-2 C.B. 467.
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tax valuation ruling holds that an illness which is expected to be
fatal in a few months is grounds for disregarding the life expectancy
tables.209
Results are not clear in cases in which potential duration is uncer-
tain. If an interest will not end at a determinable time, actual dura-
tion does not seem relevant. A perpetual interest in a finite item ap-
pears to be a permanent interest if the interest might continue
forever, or might continue for thirty years. In one ruling, a person
gave up land and received a perpetual water right.21 0 In another, a
person gave up land and received an oil lease which would continue
until the oil deposit was exhausted.21' The IRS held the interests
were like kind in both instances. Neither ruling suggested how long
the interest might actually continue.212 Suppose, for example, that
the most optimistic estimate indicated commercial oil production
could not be feasible for more than twenty years. Estimates of recov-
erable minerals are not sufficiently reliable to be accepted as a rea-
sonable measure of life expectancy. 2 3 Because oil production might
continue for thirty years, the leasehold presumably is a permanent
interest.
Similar considerations apply to other forms of ownership. Fee in-
terests such as tenancy in common or remainder are permanent be-
cause they may continue forever.21 4 The interest of a tenant by the
entities or joint tenant may expire by its terms. The interest of a
person ends at his death if he is survived by another tenant. On the
other hand, the interest of a person who survives the other tenants
becomes permanent. The third possibility is termination of a tenancy
by destruction of one or more of the unities which converts the inter-
est of each owner to a permanent interest. A destruction of unities
may occur at any time while a tenancy is in existence.21 5
A few cases suggest that factors other than time may be relevant.
One case compared the rights of a tenant in common to those of a
tenant in partnership. In a 1985 opinion, the Ninth Circuit observed
that the question is whether a significant change in investment or
control occurred, and concluded that the properties were like kind.216
The form the interest takes is not relevant. A fee simple absolute
209. Rev. Rul. 66-307, 1966-2 C.B. 429. Compare Van Horne v. Commissioner,
720 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 980 (1984).
210. Rev. Rul. 55-749, 1955-2 C.B. 295.
211. Rev. Rul. 68-331, 1968-1 C.B. 352.
212. See supra notes 210-11.
213. Compare Rev. Rul. 68-194, 1968-1 C.B. 87 with Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S.
404 (1931), and Gralapp v. United States, 319 F. Supp. 265 (D. Kan. 1970), afid., 458
F.2d 1158 (10th Cir. 1972).
214. See Rev. Rul. 73-476, 1973-2 C.B. 300; Rev. Rul. 78-4, 1978-1 C.B. 256.
215. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 6.1-.2, 616, 6.19-.26 (A. Casner ed.
1952).
216. Magneson v. Commissioner, 753 F.2d 1490, 1495-98 (9th Cir. 1985).
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is like kind to a tenancy in common, joint tenancy, tenancy by the
entireties, reversion, remainder, life estate, mineral lease, overriding
royalty, royalty, unitization agreement, working interest, easement,
right of way, and long-term leasehold. 217 When a binding sales con-
tract exists, the seller is deemed the owner of the right to be paid
and the purchaser is treated as the owner of the land. In the case of
options, equitable conversion occurs when the holder signals accept-
ance of his option. 218 In a 1977 memorandum opinion, the Tax Court
found that an interest in a trust was like kind to a fee interest under
the circumstances. 219 Other authorities 'suggest that an interest in a
trust may be equivalent to land. 220 In a 1983 opinion which was re-
viewed, the Tax Court concluded that a general partnership interest
was like kind to a fee simple interest in land. The decision was af-
firmed by the Ninth Circuit.2
Buildings
An existing building which is permanently attached to land is real
property. Unimproved land is like kind to land which is improved
with a building, and one building is like kind to another building.222
217. Rev. Rul. 73-476, 1973-2 C.B. 300; Rev. Rul. 79-44, 1979-1 C.B. 265 (ten-
ancy in common for fee simple absolute); Rev. Rul. 68-331, 1968-1 C.B. 352 (lease of oil
in place for fee interest); LTR 8135048 (June 3, 1981) (overriding royalty for fee simple
absolute); LTR 8237017 (June 11, 1982) (working interest for overriding royalty); Rev.
Rul. 68-186, 1968-1 C.B. 354 (working interest for interest in unitization agreement);
Rev. Rul. 71-549, 1972-2 C.B. 472 (easement and right-of-way for fee simple absolute);
Rev. Rul. 55-749, 1955-2 C.B. 295 (fee simple absolute for water right); Treas. Reg. §
1.1031(a)-1(c)(2) (1967). See Rev. Rul. 70-511, 1970-2 C.B. 166 (life interest in land
trust for fee simple absolute), clarified, Rev. Rul. 72-601, 1972-2 C.B. 467, distin-
guished, Rev. Rul. 78-4, 1978-1 C.B. 256 (carved-out remainder for remainder). See
Red River Lumber Co. v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 148 (Ct. Cl. 1956) (parties agreed
a variety of interests were like kind to fee simple absolute).
218. See generally 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 11.22-.23, 11.17, 11.81 (A.
Casner ed. 1952); 1 id. §§ 3.82-3.84; see also Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341,
1351-52 (9th Cir. 1979); Hayden v. United States, 50 A.F.T.R.2d 5570 (D. Wyo. 1981).
See infra text accompanying notes 283-88.
219. Rutland v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (P-H) 39, 46-48 (1977).
220. See Rev. Rul. 70-511 1970-2 C.B. 166; DiFoggio v. United States, 484 F.
Supp. 233, 236-37 (N.D. Il. 1979); Rev. Rul. 77-459, 1977-2 C.B. 239; Rev. Rul. 76-
101, 1976-1 C.B. 186; Rev. Rul. 69-40, 1969-1 C.B. 188. See infra notes 486-88. See
generally Kivall, Can a Beneficial Interest in an Illinois Land Trust Qualify for Tax-
Free Exchange Treatment? 71 ILL. B.J. 178 (1982); Fowler & Wyndelts, How Use of a
Trust Enhances the Section 1031 Nonsimultaneous Real Estate Exchange, 53 J. TAX'N
22 (1980).
221. Magneson v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 767 (1983), aff'd, 753 F.2d 1490 (9th
Cir. 1985).
222. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-l(c)(2) (1967). See supra text accompanying note
49. E.g., Rev. Rul. 72-424, 1972-2 C.B. 469.
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An item which otherwise would be a movable is deemed land if it is
part of a building or is a fixture.223 One ruling involved a water plant
and an apartment complex. The IRS observed that each building
was a fee interest in real property, and concluded they were like
kind .2
24
If a building was constructed as part of an exchange transaction,
the IRS may argue the building was not land. Accepted principles of
property law classify a building as land if the building is perma-
nently attached to land.225 Typical decisions are concerned only with
the ultimate result. Hence if a person starts off with land and winds
up with another item of land, intermediate stages of the transaction
are disregarded. 2 6 A series of rulings involve people who owned two
parcels of land. The proceeds of an involuntary conversion are used
to improve the remaining parcel. In one ruling a person gave up land
for a building, storm drain, water system, and road. The IRS found
that land did not have the same nature or character as the improve-
ments and held the properties were not like kind.227 Some courts ac-
cept the IRS position, 28 and others do not.229 The IRS position
should be rejected because it is contrary to accepted property law
and like kind principles.230
Several letters suggest what the IRS will accept when a building is
to be constructed. The individual doing the construction work should
have an ownership interest in the land. In one letter a person con-
veyed a long-term leasehold to facilitate the exchange. After con-
struction was complete, the person received the leasehold and build-
ing for land. The IRS observed that a fee interest can be acquired
solely for the purpose of making an exchange and held that the
properties were like kind.2 31 Although cash may be used to adjust
construction costs to an agreed figure, one letter used a cash adjust-
ment clause as a reason to suppose the other party might have been
223. LTR 8008113 (Nov. 29, 1979).
224. Rev. Rul. 73-120, 1973-1 C.B. 369.
225. Davis v. United States, 411 F. Supp. 964, 966 (D. Hawaii 1976), affd on
another issue, 589 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1979); LTR 8008113 (Nov. 29, 1979). See gener-
ally 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 19.1-19.7 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
226. E.g., Garcia v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 471 (1983), acq., 1984-1 C.B. 1;
Coupe v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 394 (1969), acq., 1970-1 C.B. XV.
227. Rev. Rul. 67-255, 1967-2 C.B. 270. Several other rulings reach the same con-
clusion. E.g., Rev. Rul. 76-390, 1976-2 C.B. 243.
228. See, e.g., Bloomington Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 14
(7th Cir. 1951).
229. Davis v. United States, 411 F. Supp. 964, 966 (D. Hawaii 1976), a fl'd on
another issue, 589 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1979); Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 75 T.C. 612, 612-19 (1980), subsequent proceedings on other issues, 82 T.C. 122
(1984).
230. See generally Ronce, Land and Improvements Are Definitely Not "Like
Kind" (Are They?), 61 TAXES 382 (1983).
231. LTR 8304022 (Oct. 22, 1982); see also LTR 7823035 (Mar. 9, 1978).
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an agent for the person.
232
Other Improvements
An improvement which is permanently attached to land is real
property. Unimproved land is like kind to land which is improved,
and one improvement is like kind to another improvement. 33 One
ruling concluded that city railroad track and facilities were not like
kind to replacement track and facilities located on a bypass around
the city. The IRS may have based the finding on elimination of nu-
merous street crossings. A case involved facts which did not appear
to be materially different from those set forth in the ruling. In a
1980 opinion which was reviewed, the Tax Court observed that the
ruling did not elaborate a legal basis for the finding and concluded
that the properties were like kind.23 4 Another case concludes that a
fishery and agricultural improvements such as plowing, seeding and
fertilizing are the like kind to roadway, storm drainage and water
systems for an industrial park.23 5
Leases
The IRS has not come to grips with the treatment of leases. A
leasehold is personal property under state law.286 Since 1924 the reg-
ulations have concluded that a lease of a fee with at least thirty
years to run is like kind to land.237 The thirty year requirement is
the means for determining whether the relationship of a tenant to
land is similar to that of a fee owner. The regulations have never
mentioned short-term leases. The IRS and the courts have concluded
that a short-term lease is not like kind to a fee interest in land.23 8
232. LTR 8304022 (Oct. 22, 1982); LTR 8110028 (Dec. 9, 1980); LTR 7929092
(Apr. 23, 1978); LTR 7823025 (Mar. 9, 1978); LTR 7821083 (Feb. 27, 1978).
233. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(b) (1967).
234. Rev. Rul. 57-450, 1957-2 C.B. 137; Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 75 T.C. 497, 619 n.138 (1980), subsequent proceedings on other issues, 82 T.C.
122 (1984).
235. Davis v. United States, 411 F. Supp. 964 (D. Hawaii 1976), affid on another
issue, 589 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1979).
236. E.g., 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 202, at 115-17.
237. See supra text accompanying note 79. All renewal periods are counted in
computing the term of a lease. Century Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155 (8th
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 954 (1952); Rev. Rul. 78-71, 1978-1 C.B. 258. Unless
it is a part of the lease, a possibility of renewal does not count. Capri, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 65 T.C. 162, 181-82 (1975).
238. E.g., Capri, 65 T.C. at 181-82; Rev. Rul. 83-70, 1983-1 C.B. 189. Compare
Rev. Rul. 60-4, 1960-1 C.B. 303, superseded, Rev. Rul. 72-85, 1972-1 C.B. 235 with
Bidart Bros. v. United States, 262 F.2d 607 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1003
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Judicial and administrative decisions which equate land and short-
term leases under the involuntary conversion statute cast a long
shadow over the like kind treatment of short-term leases.
239
The treatment of leases depends on several factors. Giving up land
for a long-term lease may be a like kind exchange.2 40 A landlord
who gives up a long-term lease and receives land from the tenant,
however, has not made a like kind exchange. The receipt of land is
deemed an advance payment of rent.241 If the transaction is not be-
tween landlord and tenant, however, it may be a like kind ex-
change.242 In one letter, a landlord conveyed land to his tenant for
the lease and a sublease. Since the tenant did not deal with his sub-
tenant, the IRS concluded that the tenant made a like kind ex-
change.243 The IRS presumably felt a payment to the tenant could
be rent only if it was made by the subtenant.
Long-term leases may be like kind. Apparently, a long-term lease
is not like kind to a short-term lease, and land is not like kind to a
short-term lease.244 A landlord who gives up a short-term lease for a
short-term lease from his tenant has not made a like kind exchange.
The receipt of a short-term lease is deemed an advance payment of
rent. If the transaction is not between landlord and tenant, however,
it may be a like kind exchange.2'
5
Sale and Leaseback
The treatment of sale and leaseback transactions is suspect. With
one exception, every case involving a long-term lease has concluded
that the transaction was a sale.240 Cases in which there was a short-
term leaseback have concluded there was an exchange of properties
which were not like kind.247 In one case, the IRS argued that a ten
year lease continued an investment in land. 48 In a 1975 opinion
which was officially reported, the Tax Court concluded that a real-
ized loss was deductible.24
9
(1959).
239. See supra text accompanying notes 166-71.
240. MeShain v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 154 (1977), subsequent proceedings on
another issue, 71 T.C. 998 (1979).
241. Pembroke v. Commissioner, 23 B.T.A. 1776 (1931), afid, 70 F.2d 850 (D.C.
Cir. 1934); Rev. Rul. 66-109, 1966-1 C.B. 299; Rev. Rul. 72-601, 1972-2 C.B. 467.
242. Biscayne Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 1015, 1021 (1930), acq., IX-
2 C.B. 6 (1930); Rev. Rul. 76-301, 1976-2 C.B. 241; Everett v. Commissioner, 47
T.C.M. (P-H) 278 (1978); LTR 8308019 (Nov. 22, 1982).
243. LTR 7932069 (May 11, 1979); see also LTR.8323006 (Feb. 28, 1983). See
generally 2 B. BiTTKER, supra note 38, 51.10.1.
244. See supra text accompanying note 206-07.
245. Rev. Rul. 72-601, 1972-2 C.B. 467.
246. See Crowley, Milner & Co. v. Commissioner, 689 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1982).
247. See supra text accompanying note 168.
248. Capri, Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 162, 181-82 (1975).
249. Id.
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Results suggest the existence of several problems. Short-term
leaseback decisions are an indication that short-term leases should be
like kind to land.250 One can only speculate about why the Treasury
has not changed the regulations. When the lease is like kind to land,
there are two issues. Concluding that a sale and leaseback is a sale is
questionable. A loss is not deductible unless the transaction is com-
plete. A mere change in the rights to property does not seem to be
sufficient completion.251 One commentator suggests sale and lease-
back transactions have a hollow sound when tapped.2 52
Timber
Growing trees are part of land, bare land is like kind to land with
growing trees, and land with growing trees is like kind to other land
with growing trees.2 53 The classification of timber is not affected by
differences in quantity, quality, age, and species of the timber.2 54
The common law usually classified a right to take timber as an
interest in land.2 55 The classification of timber rights is uncertain. In
one case, a person exchanged land for the right to cut and remove
timber.256 In a 1953 opinion which was officially reported, the Tax
Court reviewed Oregon decisions and concluded that the rights were
movables. That construction of the Oregon decisions is suspect. 257
Under current law most states treat a right to take timber as a con-
tract for the sale of a movable.258
A timber right for at least thirty years presumably would be like
kind to a fee.259 If a person who owns land disposes of the right to
remove timber, he usually is entitled to capital gain treatment be-
cause of his actual or deemed investment purpose.2 60 The treatment
of unharvested crops suggests that the capital gain purpose would be
250. See supra text accompanying notes 166-71.
251. E.g., Reporter Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 201 F.2d 743 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 993 (1953); Rev. Rul. 84-145, 1984-2 C.B. 188.
252. Del Cotto, Sale and Leaseback: A Hollow Sound When Tapped?, 37 TAx L.
REV. 1 (1981).
253. Rev. Rul. 72-215, 1972-2 C.B. 466.
254. Id. See generally Davenport, Exchanges of Timber Interests Under Section
1031, 6 J. AGRICULTURAL TAX'N & L. 699 (1985).
255. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.4 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
256. Oregon Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 192, 195-97 (1953), acq.,
1953-2 C.B. 5.
257. Id.
258. Uniform Sales Act § 2-107, 1 U.L.A. 143 (1972).
259. See supra text accompanying note 246.
260. E.g., Kirby Lumber Co. v. Phinney, 412 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1969); Rev. Rul.
77-229, 1977-2 C.B. 210.
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applied in a like kind context .28 Thus, if a person retains land and
exchanges a timber right which is land or deemed land for other
land, the properties are like kind. 26 2 Short-term timber rights are
like kind.2 63 Long-term and short-term timber rights presumably are
unalike.2 "
Minerals
Oil, gas, and other minerals in place are part of the land. Land is
like kind to a fee simple interest in minerals. In one case, a person
gave up a hotel for oil, gas, and other minerals. 65 In a 1940 opinion
which was officially reported, the Board observed that land is land
regardless of differences and concluded the properties were like
kind. 6 8 The IRS promptly announced disagreement with the deci-
sion. The Fifth Circuit observed there is no distinction between land
items "however dissimilar they may be in location, in attributes, and
in capacities for profitable use."'267 Hence investment details are ir-
relevant. Eleven years after it was affirmed, the IRS withdrew the
disagreement and published agreement with the decision.26 8 Since
then the IRS has regularly approved exchanging mineral interests
for other sorts of land such as ranches.
2 69
The classification of mineral rights is uncertain. One ruling ob-
serves that state law is not a consideration in classifying property
and suggests that all oil and gas rights are land.2 70 The state law
classification of mineral rights is not consistent, and the ruling would
be reasonable if a desire for uniform results was the stated explana-
tion. Mineral leases and leasehold interests such as oil payments,
overriding royalties, royalties, and working interests are classified as
261. Compare Rev. Rul. 59-229 1959-2 C.B. 180 with Dakin, The Capital Gains
Treasure Chest: Rational Estension or Expedient Distortion?, 19 LA. L. REv. 505, 519
(1954).
262. See LTR 7811056 (Dec. 13, 1977).
263. Everett v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (P-H) 278 (1978).
264. See supra text accompanying notes 237-45.
265. Crichton v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 490 (1940), nonacq., 1940-2 C.B. 10,





269. See supra note 192. See generally Sefton, Section 1031 Benefits and Pitfalls
for Oil and Gas Properties, 32 OIL & GAs TAx 698 (1984); Campbell, Crump &
Moody, Conversion of Working Interests into Overriding Royalty Interests Considered
Like Kind Exchange, 31 OIL & GAs TAx 700 (1983); Johnson, Tax-Free Exchanges of
Oil & Gas Interests Under Sections 1031 & 351, 20 INsT. OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 341
(1969).
270. See supra note 188. Apparently the IRS does not distinguish between types of
mineral rights for this purpose. E.g., Rev. Rul. 68-186, 1968-1 C.B. 354 (working inter-
est for overriding royalty); See generally IA W. SUMMERS, LAW OF OIL & GAS §§ 214,
216 (1981).
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land.2
71
A person must give up and receive interests of an adequate dura-
tion. A typical mineral lease is for a fixed period plus the life of
production.2 72 Because the term of an ordinary lease includes re-
newal periods, the length of a mineral lease presumably is the entire
time during which it may continue. An interest which might con-
tinue for thirty years is deemed to be for thirty years.2 73 Thus, a
lease which will continue until production ceases is a long-term in-
terest. With the exception of oil payments, a person who exchanges
long-term leasehold interests is given the same treatment as a person
who gives up a long-term lease for land. Giving up or receiving an
overriding royalty for land or a working interest may be a like kind
exchange. 27" Apparently an oil payment can never be like kind be-
cause it is not deemed to be an investment.275 Giving up or receiving
a long-term interest for a short-term interest is not a like kind ex-
change. The Treasury and the IRS feel that the differences in the
ownership interests preclude like kind treatment. That conclusion is
suspect.2 7 6 With the exception of oil payments, short-term interests
are apparently always like kind.2
7
A person must give up an interest which is not disguised income.
If a landlord gives up a long-term lease and receives land from his
tenant, the landlord has not made a like kind exchange. The land is
deemed an advance payment of rent.278 In one case, a person re-
ceived a ranch for a temporary oil payment. 279 The parties estimated
the transfer would continue for about three years and the reversion
occurred after about three years. In an opinion which was officially
reported, the Tax Court observed that both interests were land, and
271. Rev. Rul. 68-331, 1968-1 C.B. 352; Rev. Rul. 68-226, 1968-1 C.B. 362; LTR
7906061 (Nov. 13, 1978). See Rev. Rul. 72-117, 1972-1 C.B. 226; Appleman, Ex-
changes of Properties of Like Kind in the Oil Business, 11 N.Y.U. TAX INST. 273 (1953).
272. Appleman, supra note 271, at 275-76.
273. See supra text accompanying notes 209-19.
274. LTR 8135048 (June 3, 1985); LTR 8237017 (June 11, 1982).
275. I.T. 4003, 1950-1 C.B. 1950-1 C.B. 10, declared obsolete as to future trans-
actions, Rev. Rul. 70-177, 1970-1 C.B. 281; Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S.
260 (1958); Midfield Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 1154 (1939), acq. on another
issue, 1939-2 C.B. 25; Kimbell v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 940, 951 (1940); acq. on
another issue and nonacq., 1940-2 C.B. 5, 12; Wiseman v. Barby, 380 F.2d 121 (10th
Cir. 1967), rev'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 339 (1968).
276. See supra text accompanying notes 166-171.
277. See supra text accompanying note 245.
278. See supra text accompanying note 241.
279. Fleming v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 818 (1955), rev'd on this issue, 241 F.2d
78 (5th Cir. 1957), Circuit Court rev'd and Tax Court affid on this issue sub nom.,
Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 256 U.S. 260, 268 (1958).
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concluded that temporary and permanent interests were unalike. a0
The Supreme Court found that assignment of income was another
reason for the result.28 1 Two authors observe that "whenever a
method is discovered whereby the conversion of ordinary business in-
come into capital gain is coupled with retention of the business itself,
the Internal Revenue Service will ultimately succeed in changing the
law."2 a2
Land Contracts and Options
The presence of a contract or option concerning land is typically
disregarded. For instance, one ruling involved a person who created
an option to sell or exchange his land. When the option was exer-
cised, the other party satisfied his obligation by conveying land to
the person. The IRS disregarded the option and concluded the trans-
action was a like kind exchange of land items.283 Hence most deci-
sions are based on the end result.28 4
In a textbook exchange, two people deliver their properties to each
other at one time. Neat transactions are infrequent, however, be-
cause it is unusual that two people want to exchange properties. Dia-
gramming some multiparty exchanges is challenging. One commen-
tator suggests that a recent transaction was sufficiently complex so
that the Tax Court and Fifth Circuit may not have fully realized the
significance of some of their holdings.28 5
In some situations, a contract or option is relevant. A transaction
is not an exchange to a person unless he receives an adequate inter-
est in property. In one case, a person gave up land and received a
contract to purchase land from individuals who were not parties to
the exchange transaction. 2 6 Assignment of the contract transferred
various rights and duties to the person. For example, he received the
right of possession subject to certain restrictions. A substantial part
of the sale proceeds were invested and a fixed income was payable
under a life estate retained by one of the sellers. If any restriction
was not satisfied, the agreement gave the sellers the right to elect to
void the contract. Legal title was to have passed to the person at the
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Benjamin & Currier, The Lake Cases, 19 LA. L. REV. 579 (1959).
283. Rev. Rul. 84-121, 1984-2 C.B. 168.
284. Id. LTR 8118023 (Feb. 4, 1981); Borchard v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (P-
H) 1801 (1965); see also Boise Cascade Corp. v. Commissioner. 43 T.C.M. (P-H) 1370
(1974). See generally Kaster, Use of Option to Purchase Exchange Property Does Not
Destroy Section 1031 Exchange, 61 J. TAX'N 274 (1984); Guerin, Utilizing Option Con-
tracts to Effectuate Nontaxable Exchanges of Property, 59 TAXES 166 (1981).
285. Solomon, Recent Developments in Section 1031, 37 S. CAL. TAX INST. 12-1,
12-105 (1985).
286. Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1351-52 (9th Cir. 1979); LTR
7503250330A (Mar. 25, 1975).
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end of the life estate. The court observed that the rights received by
the person were at least as great as those provided by a long-term
leasehold, and concluded that the contract rights were like kind to
land.287 The person also must give up an adequate interest in prop-
erty. Another case involved exercise of an option to purchase con-
tained in a lease.2 8 In a 1973 opinion which was officially reported,
the Tax Court observed that the leasehold was annihilated by
merger when the person received the fee.28 9 Because destruction by
merger was not an adequate giving up of property, there was no
exchange. 90
Land for Partnership Interest
Partnership interests are excluded property only if a person ex-
changes an interest in one partnership for an interest in another
partnership. 91 Hence two interests in a single partnership may be
like kind, and a partnership interest may be like kind to another sort
of property. 92
The form of ownership interest is usually not relevant.29 3 It is not
clear whether land is like kind to a general interest in a real estate
partnership. In one case, a person's apartment and nursing home
buildings were involuntarily converted. 29 4 After attempting to
purchase a replacement, he decided construction was the best way to
acquire an acceptable investment. Because his experience in develop-
ing and operating a shopping center was inadequate, he took title
under a deed which appeared to make him a tenant in common with
an individual who had substantial experience with shopping centers.
In a 1976 memorandum opinion, the Tax Court reviewed the terms
of the deed and other agreements and found that the person owned
an interest in a real estate partnership.295 Because state law classi-
fied an interest in a partnership as personal property, the court con-
287. Id. Compare Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967).
288. Molbreak v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 382, 391 (1973), affid per curiam, 509
F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1975).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Compare I.R.C. § 1031(a)(2)(D) (1986) with H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1231-34 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 897-
98.
292. See infra text accompanying note 481.
293. See generally supra note 217.
294. M.H.S. Co. v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (P-H) 721, 724 (1976), afd per
curiam, 575 F.2d 1177 (6th Cir. 1978).
295. Id.
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eluded the properties were unalike. In a per curiam opinion, the
Sixth Circuit agreed.298
It is easy to sympathize with the person. He did his best to put
himself in the position he was in before the conversion, and his attor-
ney advised him that the replacement qualified for nonrecognition.
Several considerations support a conclusion that the decision is
wrong. The character of land is not altered by divided ownership.
Hence a fee simple absolute is like kind to interests such as a ten-
ancy in common or a life estate.297 Movables have been classified as
like kind to land when it has suited the whim of the Treasury, the
IRS, or the courts. Thus, the usual distinction between personal
property and land has been ignored in situations involving a lease of
a fee with at least thirty years to run, an oil and gas lease, and furni-
ture and equipment. 29 8 The explanation for these results seem to be
that the relationship between chattels and land was great enough so
it was more appropriate to treat the movables as like kind to land.
A real estate partnership typically creates a substantial relation-
ship with land. A general partner usually is entitled to a voice in the
management of land, a share of the proceeds from disposition of
land, and part of the loss or profit from land operations. 29 The inter-
est of a partner usually is classified as a tenancy by partnership.300
The goal of a lease is to give the tenant a right of possession. Since
other aspects of a lease seem irrelevant, it is the possessory right
which the Treasury uses to equate a long-term lease of a fee to a fee
interest. A life estate may result when a person has a right of direct
enjoyment by using the land itself, or when his right is to receive
income flowing from use by another. Possession in the form of a
right to receive a cash income may be like kind to land.301 A partner
has the right to income produced by permitting the partnership to
use what amounts to the partner's interest in land. Objections may
be based on the differences between the position of a tenant and that
of a partner. Comparing the features of a typical long-term lease of
a fee to a typical real estate partnership agreement leads to the con-
clusion that the position of a tenant is further removed from land
than is the interest of a general partner. The only positive aspect of
the decision is adherence to the general rule announced by the Trea-
296. Id.
297. Rev. Rul. 72-601, 1972-2 C.B. 467; Rev. Rul. 79-44, 1979-1 C.B. 265.
298. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-l(c) (1975); Rev. Rul. 68-331, 1968-1 C.B. 352;
Pappas v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1078, 1088 (1982).
299. See generally 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.8-6.9 (A. Casner ed.
1952); 3 id. § 12.79; 4 id. § 18.45.
300. See Magneson v. Commissioner, 753 F.2d 1490, 1495-98 (9th Cir. 1985).
301. E.g., Rev. Rul. 68-331, 1968-1 C.B. 352; Starker v. United States, 692 F.2d
1341, 1351-52 (9th Cir. 1979); Koch v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 54, 68-69, Action on
Decision: CC 1979-86 (May 16, 1979), acq., 1979-1 C.B. 1.
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sury. Considering the treatment of other property, following the gen-
eral rule is faint praise.
Another decision concludes that a partnership interest can be like
kind to land.302 In a planned series of transactions, a person gave up
a fee simple for a tenancy in common. The tenancy was immediately
exchanged for a general interest in a real estate partnership. In a
1983 opinion which was reviewed, the Tax Court observed that a
partnership interest could be like kind to land and concluded that
the transaction qualified for like kind treatment.03 While a tenancy
in common is freely alienable, specific partnership property is not.
Because like kind treatment is not available unless a person intends
to retain the replacement property, the primary concern is opera-
tions. The Ninth Circuit observed that possession and control as a
general partner were of the same nature as possession and control as




Congressional goals, such as reducing uncertainty, identify a sys-
tem where a reasonably astute person usually can determine tax con-
sequences in advance of an exchange. Planning requires rules or
standards which can be applied with at least a reasonable degree of
confidence. Since Congress did not suggest general criterion for ap-
plying the statute, the task was delegated to the Treasury.
Treasury Attitude
Consideration of investment details seems precluded by the like
kind regulation. The 1921 version observed: "the fact that . . . real
estate . . . is improved or unimproved makes no real difference
.. .., Subsequent editions introduced examples which apply the
principal.30 6 The Treasury has not continued strict adherence to the
principal. The 1934 general nonrecognition regulation calls for com-
paring investments in like kind cases.3 07 Because Congress has disap-
proved comparison of investments for like kind purposes, it is inap-
302. Magneson v. Commissioner, 753 F.2d 1490, 1495-98 (9th Cir. 1985).
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Treas. Reg. 62, art. 1566(a) (1921), reprinted in 136 INTERNAL REVENUE
AcTs OF 1909-1950.
306. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
307. See supra text accompanying note 159.
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propriate to apply the strict construction regulation in like kind
situations. 308
IRS Attitude
With occasional digressions, the IRS approach to real property
transactions has been reasonably balanced. One index lists over 150
letter rulings issued between 1954 and 1986.309 Most involved land,
and a large percentage conclude that the proposal involved an ex-
change of like kind properties. 310 Many more transactions have pro-
ceeded without advance assurance from the IRS.31 Hence most pro-
posed land transactions can be completed expeditiously with at least
reasonable certainty that the properties are like kind.
The IRS application of the real property standard is not com-
pletely predictable. Although the standard seemed beyond debate,
the IRS litigated a case where a city house was compared to unde-
veloped land in a mangrove swamp, and another involving improved
city land and a ranch.312 After losing, the IRS seemed to quit litigat-
ing similar cases, and the facts of these cases were adopted by the
regulations starting in 1934.313
Applying the real property standard to an exchange of hotel for
oil, gas and other minerals in the ground was too much for the IRS
to swallow. In a 1941 opinion the Fifth Circuit observed that the
standard does not distinguish "between parcels of real property,
however dissimilar they may be in location, in attributes and in ca-
pacities for profitable use. '' 314 The IRS has cited that standard with
approval on several occasions, so one might assume it has been ac-
cepted by the IRS.31 5 Recent developments suggest that the IRS has
not accepted the standard. A 1978 Tax Court opinion rejects similar
IRS arguments. 316 Caution strongly suggests an advance ruling. A
situation which seems to require an advance IRS determination does
not appear to satisfy the congressional goal of reducing uncertainty.
308. See supra text accompanying note 173.
309. Available Dec. 18, 1986, on LEXIS, Fedtax library, PR file.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Biscayne Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 1015, 1017-18, 1020 (1930)
acq., X-I C.B. 6 (1930); Pearce v. Commissioner, 13 B.T.A. 150 (1928), acq., VIII-2
C.B. 41 (1929). Perhaps amusingly, the IRS seems to have conceded the issue before
either case went to trial. G.C.M. 2641, VI-2 C.B. 16 (1927), declared obsolete without
replacement, Rev. Rul. 69-31, 1969-1 C.B. 307.
313. Treas. Reg. 86, art. 112(b)(1)-I (1934), reprinted in 140 INTERNAL REVENUE
AcTs OF 1909-1950.
314. Commissioner v. Crichton, 122 F.2d 181, 182 (5th Cir. 1941).
315. E.g., Rev. Rul. 68-331, 1968-1 C.B. 352.
316. Koch v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 54, 68-69 (1978), Action on Decision: CC
1979-86 (May 16, 1979), acq., 1979-1 C.B. 1.
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Judicial Attitude
The courts have brushed aside arguments based on apparent dif-
ferences. In one case, a person held undeveloped land for investment,
and operated a golf course and clubhouse business at another loca-
tion. Both parcels were exchanged for land subject to long-term con-
dominium leases. The IRS argued that the properties were unalike
because the leases provided a steady stream of income. 31 7 In a 1978
opinion which was officially reported, the Tax Court observed that
the statute "was not intended to draw any distinction between par-
cels of real property however dissimilar they may be in location, in
attributes and in capacities for profitable use. 31 8 While considering
the decision, the IRS observed that land is land regardless of appar-




The compatibility of movables depends on the purpose of the in-
quiry. In an action for breach of a movables contract, equity will on
rare occasions conclude that the property is unique.320 Movables are
sometimes deemed comparable where value is the issue for purposes
such as property taxation and theft losses. Relevancy is the criterion
for determining the admissibility of evidence supporting an at-
tempted comparison. The value of a Chevette has no apparent rele-
vance to the value of Hitler's 1938 supercharged Mercedes. If evi-
dence is admitted, the question is the weight to be given to the
evidence. 21 The number of factors which have been considered may
exceed the imagination of mankind.3 22 Comparing items for like kind
purposes may be the opposite extreme. There is evidence which sug-
gests that each movable is like kind to every other movable.323
The intent of Congress is not clear. The goals expressed by Con-
gress and the Treasury included reducing uncertainty and encourag-
ing business adjustments.2 4 During 1921 Finance Committee hear-
317. Koch, 71 T.C. at 66.
318. Id. at 68.
319. Id.
320. 15A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1146 (1964).
321. 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 176, § 462.
322. E.g., I J. BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 294-318 (3d ed. 1937).
323. See supra text accompanying notes 66-69, 145-46.
324. See supra text accompanying note 8.
1111
ings, Adams was asked for examples of qualified properties. He felt
stocks were like kind to stocks, and bonds were like kind to bonds.
325
The regulation under the 1921 Act clearly indicated that arguable
differences in stocks, or in bonds, have no bearing on whether they
are like kind. 26 Congress and the Treasury have not offered reasona-
bly specific guidance for the treatment of movables generally. Hence
there is room for speculation about the standard for applying the
statute to movables.
State Law
State law typically is used to determine whether property is land
or a movable. A movable is deemed land if it constitutes a fixture
under state law.327 Decisions reflecting a tendancy to disregard state
law are mentioned in the material on land.328 In a 1982 opinion
which was officially reported, the Tax Court concluded that furniture
and equipment were like kind to land.329 Indiscriminate treatment of
state law classification does not satisfy the congressional goal of re-
ducing uncertainty.
Physical Properties
Property is a generic term which covers items subject to ownership
and interests the law will protect. 330 Assuming adequate ownership
interests, 331 the question is whether the items are sufficiently alike to
constitute like kind properties. Attention has focused on factors such
as size, shape, location, use potential, income producing ability, re-
sale prospects, evaluation methods, and markets. For instance, a rul-
ing on gold coins concludes that size and shape are not relevant.
332
Considerations such as the potential for use, and markets, should be
rejected because they call for comparing investments.33 3 Hence any
attempt to compare or contrast items requires a different approach.
Trade-Ins
In the 1920s, the IRS seemed unaware of the like kind statute or
uncertain of whether it applied to trade-ins. A ruling which applied
the statute to trade-ins was revoked, and most of the early decisions
325. See supra text accompanying note 49.
326. Treas. Reg. 62, art. 1566(a) (1921), reprinted in 136 INTERNAL REVENUE
AcTs OF 1909-1950.
327. LTR 8312014 (Dec. 15, 1982).
328. See supra text accompanying notes 185-89.
329. Pappas v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1078, 1080, 1088 (1982).
330. See supra text accompanying note 202.
331. See supra text accompanying notes 202-20.
332. Rev. Rul. 76-214, 1976-1 C.B. 218.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 155-73. One letter concludes that market-
ability is irrelevant. LTR 8202101 (Oct. 16, 1981).
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did not mention the statute.14 A case which marks the turning point
involved a person who gave up a printing press and cash for a new
printing press.3 35 In a 1930 opinion which was officially reported, the
Board observed that the transaction was a like kind exchange and
concluded that gain was not recognized. The IRS promptly an-
nounced agreement with the decision and reinstated the trade-in rul-
ing.3 37 Since then the statute has regularly been applied to trade-ins.
An exchange of used property for new property usually does not
create a serious classification issue. In one case, a surgeon exchanged
a 36-foot Chris Craft yacht for a 41-foot Hatteras yacht.338 In a
1975 memorandum opinion, the Tax Court found the primary pur-
pose was business entertainment of other physicians and concluded
the properties were like kind. 3 9
Use Test
The Tax Court, the IRS, and the Treasury have not come to grips
with the classification issue. A motor vehicle clause was added to the
regulations in 1934.340 A used truck is equated to a new truck, and a
used passenger automobile is equated to a new passenger automo-
bile. For like kind purposes, there is no difference between passenger
automobiles and trucks. Hence Hitler's 1938 supercharged Mercedes
is like kind to a moving truck.3" The motor vehicle clause appears to
include a use condition. While the language might be an expression
of general like kind requirements, that explanation is unsatisfactory
because land examples did not include similar language.3 42
The IRS does not feel that use is the sole criterion. In a 1972
ruling, a person gave up residential rental property and received a
farm and farm machinery.4 3 The IRS observed that "the fact that
the assets in the aggregate comprise a business or an integrated eco-
334. See supra text accompanying notes 82, 114-26.
335. W.H. Hartman v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 302 (1930), acq., X-1 C.B. 27,
approved, I.T. 2573, X-1 C.B. 215 (1931), declared obsolete without replacement, Rev.
Rul. 67-446, 1967-2 C.B. 427.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Harris v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (P-H) 1164 (1975), Action on Decision
(Jan. 21, 1976).
339. Id.
340. Treas. Reg. 86, art. 112(b)(1)-I (1934), reprinted in 140 INTERNAL REVENUE
AcTS OF 1909-1950.
341. See supra text accompanying notes 93-97.
342. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
343. Rev. Rul. 72-151, 1972-1 C.B. 225.
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nomic investment does not result in treating the exchange as a dispo-
sition of a single piece of property."'344 It would appear that IRS did
not reject use as a criterion. The IRS concluded that an exchange
must satisfy both a use test and a like kind test which compares
physical properties. The IRS found the machinery failed the like
kind test because land and movables were dissimilar properties. 45
Business movables may be a class of property. In a 1978 letter, a
person gave up banking equipment, furniture, fixtures, and equip-
ment, for banking equipment, furniture, fixtures and equipment.
3 46
The IRS did not mention the physical properties test. 47 The letter
observed that both groups of properties were held for investment or
business use and concluded that like kind treatment was available.3 48
Hence use seemed to be the sole criterion for comparison.
Several IRS decisions are vague because movables are not ade-
quately identified. In a 1957 ruling, two operating telephone compa-
nies exchanged all of their assets, which included land and mov-
ables.349 The IRS found like kind treatment was available because
there was "an exchange of the assets of one such business for identi-
cal assets of another such business .... -35o The telephone ruling
was applied by a 1961 telephone letter351 and a 1967 letter on elec-
tricity generation and distribution businesses.352 A 1968 ruling in-
volved a number of people who agreed to unitize production from
several oil wells.353 Under a related agreement, they exchanged in-
terests in production equipment. The IRS did not offer an explana-
tion for the conclusion that the equipment items were like kind.3"
The no explanation procedure was applied by a 1985 ruling on tele-
vision broadcasting business.3 55
The Tax Court has a comparable approach to groups of business
movables. A 1945 memorandum opinion involved a construction and
excavation business which used equipment such as tractors, bulldoz-
ers, scrapers, sacrifiers, and compressors.3 56 The court observed that
"[it is a general practice in the contracting industry to obtain spe-
344. Id.
345. Id.; see also Rev. Rul. 72-151, 1972-1 C.B. 225; LTR 6904230160A (Apr.
23, 1969); LTR 7110050290A (Oct. 5, 1971).
346. LTR 7824051 (Mar. 17, 1978). Another letter gives blanket approval to
"miscellaneous other tangible personal property .... " LTR 8340041 (July 5, 1983).
347. LTR 7824051 (Mar. 17, 1978).
348. Id.
349. Rev. Rul. 57-365, 1957-2 C.B. 521; LTR 5701285800A (Jan. 28, 1957).
350. Id.
351. LTR 6111166240A (Nov. 16, 1961).
352. LTR 6711025580A (Nov. 2, 1967).
353. Rev. Rul. 68-186, 1968-1 C.B. 354.
354. Id.
355. Rev. Rul. 85-135, 1985-2 C.B. 181.
356. Farrish v. Commissioner, 14 T.C.M. (P-H) 169 (1945).
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cial equipment needed for a particular job by trading [unneeded]
equipment," and concluded that the properties were like kind.357 No
explanation was offered for the failure to identify the sorts of equip-
ment items involved in each exchange. The group approach may
have been applied in cases dealing with banking assets, cattle, print-
ing presses, and starch for unspecified assets.358
The Tax Court has gone further than the IRS. In one case, a per-
son gave up his interest in an apartment building for an interest in a
hotel and hotel furniture and equipment. 359 In a 1982 opinion which
was officially reported, the court concluded that the movables were
like kind to the building.360 Feudal law placed farms and farm mov-
ables in the same class because the movables had a close relationship
to land. 6' The only apparent way to equate hotel movables and an
apartment building is to find that the movables are deemed land be-
cause of their use in the hotel business. Hence the twentieth century
has been launched into the era of feudal law.
Use is not an appropriate criterion. The 1921 regulation suggested
a like kind test which compared physical properties and a use test.362
Uncertainty culminated in a 1924 request by the Treasury to repeal
the use test. Congress agreed that use was not a fair basis for taxa-
tion, and repealed the use test.36 3 Since 1924 the sole criterion is the
like kind test which compares physical properties. 3 "
Continuity of Investment
The current regulation follows the 1921 approach. Hence business
movables must satisfy both a use test and a physical property test.365
In the case of investment properties, the regulation merely requires
357. Id. at 170.
358. Beckley Nat'l Exch. Bank v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. Mem. (P-H) 681
(1940) (banking assets); see also W.H. Hartman Co. v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 302
(1930), acq., X-1 C.B. 27 (1931) (printing presses); Helis v. Usry, 464 F.2d 330 (5th
Cir. 1972) (starch for unidentified assets). See generally Lumberg, Treatment of Oil
Exchanges Between Companies: What Basis for Nontaxability?, 64 J. TAX'N 38 (1985).
359. Pappas v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1077, 1080, 1088 (1972).
360. Id. See Magneson v. Commissioner, 753 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1985).
361. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 87, at 149-50. Congress has
adopted a similar approach for another purpose. I.R.C. § 897(c)(6)(B)(1986); Treas.
Reg. § 1.897-1(b)(4)(i)(1984).
362. Treas. Reg. 62, art. 1566(a) (1921), reprinted in 136 INTERNAL REVENUE
ACTS OF 1909-1950.
363. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
364. Id.
365. See supra text accompanying note 80.
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that both items be held for investment."6 Although business and in-
vestment are supposed to be interchangeable, several decisions reach
a contrary result.
The continuity doctrine has been applied to collectible coins. The
initial reaction was that the transactions qualified for like kind treat-
ment. A 1976 ruling compares noncurrency mexican gold pesos and
noncurrency austrian gold coronas. The IRS observed that both were
bullion coins and concluded they were like kind.387 Nevertheless, in a
1979 ruling which involved United States gold coins and south afri-
can krugerrand gold coins, the analysis began with a reference to the
legislative history of the different sex statute.368 Krugerrands were
valued for their gold content while the United States coins were val-
ued for numismatic desirability. The IRS found investment in a gold
market is different from investment in a collectables market and
concluded that the coins were unalike.3 69 One author observed that
the "ruling fails to state which type is masculine, and which
feminine. "370
The doctrine has also been applied to precious metals. Letters is-
sued in 1980 and 1981 compare gold and silver bullion. 371 Both cited
the 1976 and 1979 coins rulings and concluded the properties were
like kind. 72 Early in 1982 attention was directed to the difference
between the markets for gold and silver. That apparently caused the
IRS to have a change of heart. In a 1982 ruling which compared
gold and silver bullion the IRS observed that gold is an investment
in itself while silver typically is valued as an industrial commodity,
and concluded that the properties were unalike.
373
Currency status is another approach to distinguishing investments.
One case compares United States double eagle gold coins and swiss
francs.37 4 In a 1981 opinion which was officially reported, the Tax
Court observed that the francs were an investment in the swiss na-
tional economy, while the coins were valued for numismatic desira-
bility and concluded that the properties were unalike.37 The Ninth
366. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-i(c) (3) (1967).
367. Rev. Rul. 76-214, 1976-1 C.B. 218.
368. Rev. Rul. 79-143, 1979-1 C.B. 264.
369. Id.
370. 2 B. BITrKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 44-12
n.11 (1981). See generally Scott, Gold and Silver Coins: Taxes on Shelters, 7 REV.
TAX'N OF INDIVIDUALS 3 (1983); Levine & Glioklich, Tax Free Real Estate Transac-
tions, 10 J. REAL ESTATE TAX'N 294, 297-98 (1983).
371. LTR 8020107 (Feb. 25, 1980); LTR 8128102 (Apr. 20, 1981).
372. Id.
373. Rev. Rul. 82-166, 1982-2 C.B. 190.
374. California Fed. Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 108 (1981), affd, 680
F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1982). See generally Reynolds, Tax Free Exchanges of Interests in
Thoroughbred Horses, 59 TAXES 547, 549-550 (1981).
375. Id.
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Circuit relied on the different sex statute as evidence of a congres-
sional desire for the treatment of movables in general and affirmed
the decision .376 There is no evidence to support the suggestion that
Congress intended that land and movables should be treated
differently.
Results in metal and money cases illustrate the sort of uncertainty
Congress wanted to avoid. 77 Comparing investments created
problems which prompted the Treasury to ask for a change. The
Treasury concluded that comparing investments was not a fair basis
for making decisions. Congress agreed that comparing investments
was unfair and concluded that all investments would be deemed
identical for like kind purposes. 8"
Like Kind Test
Distinctions based on use or investment are improper. Compari-
sons are to be based on features of the physical properties. The ques-
tion is which aspects are relevant? Approaches based on attributes
376. Id.















378. See supra text accompanying notes 174-208.
Citation
Yes 1975 LTR 7507220610A
Yes 1976 (July 22, 1975) Rev. Rul.
76-214, 1976-1 C.B. 218
Yes 1975 LTR 77030708518A
Yes 1977 (Mar. 7, 1977)
No 1979 Rev. Rul. 79-143, 1979-1
C.B. 264
Yes 1981 LTR 8117053
(Jan. 28, 1981)
Yes 1982 LTR 8202101
(Oct. 16, 1982)
Yes 1982 Rev. Rul. 82-96, 1982-1
C.B. 113
Yes 1980 LTR 8020107
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(Apr. 20, 1981)
No 1982 Rev. Rul. 82-166, 1982-2
C.B. 190
No 1981-82 California Fed. Life Ins.
Co. v. Commissioner, 76
T.C. 107 (1981), affd,
















such as size and shape have been rejected .379 Rejection seems appro-
priate since size and shape have no apparent bearing on whether
properties are like kind.380 Other considerations such as methods of
evaluation and markets should also be rejected, because they are not
pertinent to classification.
Congress intended to create a broad class or classes of property.
The legislative histories do not contain a direct statement about the
scope of each class. An inference may be drawn from the general
goals expressed by Congress. The principal goal was to reduce uncer-
tainty.38 1 By making land a single class, the Treasury created a sys-
tem which is reasonably certain. With a few exceptions, items which
seem alike are like kind. No one knows which movables may be like
kind at a given moment. For example, is a business use passenger
automobile like kind to a passenger automobile held for investment?
The very fact that there is question indicates uncertainty. Decisions
involving business movables, precious metals, and collectible coins
suggest that it would be very easy for the IRS to conclude that the
automobiles were unalike.3 82
The only approach which appears to reduce uncertainty is to make
movables a single class of property. It is not possible to make a rea-
sonably educated guess about whether properties are alike because
the Treasury and the IRS have carefully avoided reliable suggestions
about general approaches to classifying movables. There is no appar-
ent way to distinguish between passenger automobiles. Hence
Hitler's 1938 supercharged Mercedes should be like kind to a
Chevette, even though they have little in common when viewed from
a use or investment viewpoint. The fact that the Chevette is put to a
business use while the Mercedes is held for investment is not rele-
vant.38 3 If like kind exchanges are permitted, why should it matter
that a person gave up a gold coin for silver bullion, a book, painting,
or passenger automobile? When use and investment are disregarded,
the only apparent way to distinguish movables is by arbitrary classi-
fication. The 1921 regulation concluded that stocks and bonds were
unalike 84 The distinction presumably was based on the differences
in the rights typically created by those forms of property. The con-
clusion was rejected in every case because the courts felt the classes
379. See e.g., Rev. Rul. 76-214, 1976-1 C.B. 218.
380. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-l(b) (1967); Commissioner v. Crichton, 42
B.T.A. 490 (1940), nonacq., 1940-2 C.B. 10, nonacq. withdrawn and acq. substituted,
1952-1 C.B. 12, af'd, 122 F.2d 181, 182 (5th Cir. 1941).
381, See supra text accompanying note 8.
382. See supra text accompanying notes 339-46. See Levine & Glioklich, supra
note 370, at 297-98.
383. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-l(a) (1967).
384. Treas. Reg. 62, art. 1566(a) (1921), reprinted in 136 INTERNAL REVENUE
AcTs OF 1909-1950.
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were inappropriately narrow. In one case, the Second Circuit con-
cluded that personal property was a single class of property for like
kind purposes.385
Metals and Money
Administrative and judicial decisions have been discussed.3 86 The
results which appear to be proper are illustrated by the following
material. Precious metals are like kind. Hence gold is like kind to
silver.3 87 Precious metals are like kind to other metals. Thus, gold is
like kind to iron. Noncurrency coins are like kind if both are bullion
coins made of the same metal. One ruling involves coins issued by
other countries, and two letters deal with foreign and United States
coins.388 United States coins would be like kind under the same con-
ditions. Noncurrency foreign or United States coins are like kind to
bullion if both involve the same metal.389 A noncurrency bullion coin
of silver is like kind to a noncurrency bullion coin of gold or some
other metal, or to bullion of silver or another metal.3 90
Noncurrency numismatic coins are like kind. Hence foreign coins
and United States coins may be like kind.39 1 Numismatic and bul-
lion coins are like kind.892 Noncurrency paper monies are like kind.
Hence foreign paper money items and United States paper money
items may be like kind. There is no reason to distinguish between
noncurrency money items. Thus, paper money items are like kind to
numismatic or bullion coins.
Currency money items are like kind.393 There is no apparent rea-
son to distinguish between foreign money items which have no bul-
lion or numismatic value. Hence foreign paper or coin money items
are like kind to each other or to United States paper or coin money
items. There is no apparent grounds to differentiate between cur-
rency and noncurrency money items. Thus, foreign coin or paper
385. See supra text accompanying notes 74.
386. See supra text accompanying notes 365-78.
387. LTR 8020107 (Feb. 25, 1980); LTR 8128102 (Apr. 20, 1981). Contra Rev.
Rul. 82-166, 1982-2 C.B. 190.
388. Rev. Rul. 76-214, 1976-1 C.B. 218; LTR 7507220610A (July 22, 1975);
LTR 7703070851A (Mar. 7, 1977).
389. Rev. Rul. 82-96, 1982-1 C.B. 113.
390. See supra note 387 and accompanying text.
391. See LTR 7507220610A (July 22, 1975).
392. LTR 7703070851A (Mar. 7, 1977). Contra Rev. Rul. 79-143, 1979-1 C.B.
264.
393. United States money which has no value other than as currency could be an
investment because of the potential for gain on foreign exchange markets.
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Congress was concerned with farming tax shelters in 1969, and
considered various ways to deal with them. The House report identi-
fied several problems including advice given by promoters of cattle
feeding shelters. Some promoters told their customers that male
calves could be like kind exchanged for female calves.395 Because
male calves are typically sold, they usually do not qualify for like
kind treatment because they are held primarily for sale. The House
did not recommend legislation because it felt existing law was ade-
quate. The House did suggest that the IRS should publish its posi-
tion. The Senate, however, preferred a stronger response to the
problem.396
Livestock of the same sex may be like kind. In a 1978 memoran-
dum opinion, the Tax Court concluded that half blood heifers were
like kind to three-quarter blood heifers. 397 Livestock of different
sexes are deemed held primarily for sale. A 1971 letter compares a
quarter horse stallion to a quarter horse gelding. 98 The IRS ob-
served that a gelded horse could never be used for breeding and con-
cluded that the properties were not alike.399
Congressional Attitude
Use and investment criterion were to be applied in comparing
properties under the 1921 Act. Both were rejected in 1924. Congress
explained that the tests did not provide a fair basis for taxation be-
cause they were uncertain. Since that view has not changed, compar-
ison of uses or investments is improper.
Treasury Attitude
The 1921 regulation did not deal directly with movables. The
Treasury used lots of words which seemed to describe like kind
394. Contra California Fed. Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 107 (1981),
aff'd 680 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1982).
395. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1969).
396. S. REP. No. 552. 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 102, reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 241-42.
397. Rutherford v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (P-H) 2120 (1978). See Woodbury
v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 180, 185-89 197-99 (1967), acq., 1969-2 C.B. xxvi. Wylie v.
United States, 21 A.F.T.R.2d 972, 980, 983 (N.D. Tex. 1968); LTR 7903054 (Oct. 18,
1978). Reynolds, Tax-Free Exchanges of Interests in Thoroughbred Horses, 59 TAXES
547 (1981).
398. LTR 7110050290A (Oct. 5, 1971). See LTR 7903064 (Oct. 18, 1978).
399. LTR 7110050290A (Oct. 5, 1971). See supra text accompanying notes 340-
64.
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properties. 40 0 Standing by themselves, the words were useless. Exam-
ples provided a degree of meaning where a transaction involved land,
stocks, or bonds. 401 Movables were not covered until a motor vehicle
clause was added in 1934.402 The motor vehicle example is so bland
that it has not been seriously challenged in fifty-two years.
One can only speculate about why the Treasury has not added
more examples for movables. Perhaps movables are not sufficiently
important to warrant the Treasury's time. Another possibility is that
the Treasury was unwilling to sanction some exchanges which would
have been approved by a general standard similar to the one which
was created for land. Rejection of the attempt to distinguish between
debt and equity suggests that the courts would not accept narrow
classifications for movables. The possibility of rejection presumably
diminished the chance that the Treasury would issue general stan-
dards for movables.
One factor is lack of an established system for classifying mov-
ables. The common law was typically concerned with ownership of
interests in property, or injury to property. If property or an interest
was injured, the usual remedies were money damages or specific per-
formance. Since there is no established system for comparing mov-
ables, classification looks more like a question of philosophy. Perhaps
the Treasury felt the IRS and the courts would be able to deal effec-
tively with a philosophical question. Even with sixty-five years of ex-
perience, results suggest they are not equal to the task. The Treasury
also did not seem to have a handle on the problem when it suggested
improper use and investment tests in 1934.4°3 Those suggestions have
not been modified.
IRS Attitude
The IRS is not likely to take steps toward establishing a broad
policy for movables. The IRS typically avoids any appearance of
making general policy, especially where the Treasury has declined to
act. The IRS seems to dislike broad policy because it reduces the
number of options which may be available in adversary situations. In
the case of land, the IRS had to be confronted several times with
400. Tres. Reg. 62, art. 1566(a) (1921), reprinted in 136 INTERNAL REVENUE
AcTs OF 1909-1950.
401. See supra notes 75-91 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
403. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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Treasury policy.404 Because there is no general policy for movables,
the IRS has expanded the use and investment approaches suggested
by the Treasury.405 Success in obtaining ad hoc decisions is another
factor indicating that the IRS is unlikely to propose general stan-
dards for movables.
Since one cannot be sure what the IRS may do from one minute
to the next, an advance ruling seems indispensable.406 A fluid situa-
tion where an advance determination appears indispensable does not
satisfy the congressional goal of reducing uncertainty.40 7
Judicial Attitude
Land opinions normally have brushed aside arguments based on
details and have followed the letter and spirit of the Treasury stan-
dard.40 8 On the other hand, personal property decisions vacillate
from liberal to conservative without paying lip service to classifica-
tion based on physical characteristics. Perhaps the most permissive
result in a 1982 officially reported Tax Court opinion, which found
that land was like kind to furniture and equipment. 409 The conclu-
sion did not seem to be an accident since the court stated the issue at
one point and offered discussion at another. 10 Precedential value is
uncertain because the opinion failed to identify the exact ground for
the result. Among the possibilities are use of the business chattel
rule to equate movables and land, and disapproval of the general
distinction between land and personal property. The conclusion that
stocks are like kind to bonds is not far behind. In a 1929 opinion
which was reviewed, the Board rejected arguments based on ac-
cepted differences between debt and equity.411 On appeal, the Sec-
ond Circuit concluded that personal property is a single class of
property.412 Although the Second Circuit suggested a general classi-
fication for personal property, the decision has not been cited in con-
nection with other sorts of personal property.
A series of decisions involve equity interests in real estate partner-
ships. In officially reported opinions between 1972 and 1982, the Tax
Court concluded that general partnership interests may be like
404. See supra text accompanying notes 190-200.
405. See supra text accompanying notes 305-08.
406. See supra id.
407. See supra text accompanying notes 312-17.
408. Compare Koch v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 54, 66, 68-69 (1978) with Pem-
broke v. Helvering, 23 B.T.A. 1176 (1931), aff'd, 70 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1934).
409. Pappas v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1078, 1080, 1088 (1982).
410. Id.
411. Greene v. Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 401 (1929), a f'd, 42 F.2d 852 (2d Cir.
1930). See Edson v. Lucas, 40 F.2d 398 (8th Cir. 1930); Castell v. United States, 20 F.
Supp. 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1937), rev'd on other grounds, 98 F.2d 88 (2d Cir.), cert, denied,
305 U.S. 652 (1938).
412. Greene, 42 F.2d at 853-54.
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kind. 413 Although the parallel to the stock and bond cases is ines-
capable, they are not discussed or cited in the partnership opinions.
The first decision suggested a detailed comparison of general part-
nership interests, and a comparison was made in a subsequent
case.414 Nevertheless, there has been no suggestion of what factors
might be considered.
A 1981 officially reported Tax Court opinion is at the opposite end
of the spectrum. 415 The conclusion that swiss francs and United
States gold coins were unalike was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit.
The result was based on differences in investment. Since Congress
concluded that investment differences is not a ground for comparing
properties, there is no acceptable justification for the result. Several
decisions are not far removed from the extreme. In a 1972 opinion
which was reviewed, the Tax Court concluded that general and lim-
ited partnership interests were unalike.41 6 The court found the
properties were unlike because of the differences in rights. Failure to
discuss or cite the stock and bond decisions leaves the impression
that the case was not carefully considered. Other decisions appear to
apply a use test to business movable situations. Congress has decided
that use is not a grounds for comparing properties. Because no other
explanation is offered, those cases are suspect.
INTANGIBLES
Introduction
The compatibility of intangibles depends on the purpose of the in-
quiry. In an action for breach of a contract to sell an intangible,
equity may conclude that the property is unique.417 Intangibles are
sometimes deemed comparable where value is the issue for purposes
such as patent infringement or loss of services. Relevancy is the cri-
terion for determining the admissibility of evidence supporting an
attempted comparison. If evidence is admitted, the question is the
413. Meyer v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 311, 314 (1972), nonacq., 1975-1 C.B. 3;
Office Memoranda 18107 (Sept. 30, 1974); Office Memoranda 18881 (Nov. 23, 1977);
G.C.M. 34347 (Dec. 15, 1977); Action on Decision: TC:TI (Dec. 27, 1974), affd per
curiam, 503 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1974); Rev. Rul. 78-134, 1978-1 C.B. 256; Gulfstream
Land & Dev. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 587 (1979); Long v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.
1045 (1981); Pappas v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1078 (1982).
414. Meyer, 58 T.C. at 314; Long, 77 T.C. at 1045.
415. California Fed. Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 107 (1981), affd, 680
F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1982). See supra text accompanying note 378.
416. Meyer, 58 T.C. at 314.
417. See supra text accompanying note 11.
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weight to be given to the evidence. 18 The number of factors which
have been considered may exceed the imagination of mankind.41 9
Comparing items for like kind purposes may be the opposite ex-
treme. There is evidence which suggests that each intangible is like
kind to every other intangible.42 0
The intent of Congress is not clear. The goals expressed by Con-
gress and the Treasury included reducing uncertainty and encourag-
ing business adjustments.4 2' During the 1921 Finance Committee
hearings, Adams was asked for examples of qualified properties. He
felt stocks were like kind to stocks, and bonds were like kind to
bonds.422 The regulation under the 1921 Act clearly indicated that
arguable differences in stocks, or in bonds, had no bearing on
whether they were like kind.423 Since 1924 the regulations have
equated land to a leasehold of a fee with at least thirty years to
run.4 24 Congress and the Treasury have not offered reasonably spe-
cific guidance for the treatment of intangibles generally. Hence there
is room for speculation about the standard for applying the statute to
intangibles.
State Law
The effect of state law is not clear. State law identifies property
subject to ownership and the extent of ownership interests.425 There
are several approaches to classifying intangibles as land or movable.
Some authorities follow state law, others misconstrue it, a third type
offers excuses for not applying it, and another group ignores it.426 A
series of approaches to state law does not satisfy the congressional
goal of reducing uncertainty.
Land Test
Intangibles may be deemed land. Although some authorities pay
lip service to it, state law is not a generally accepted criterion.427 The
question is whether there is an adequate relationship between the
418. 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 176, § 462.
419. See supra text accompanying note 322.
420. See supra text accompanying notes 69, 145-46.
421. See supra text accompanying note 8.
422. See supra text accompanying note 49.
423. Treas. Reg. 62, art. 1566(a) (1921), reprinted in 137 INTERNAL REVENUE
ACTS OF 1909-1950.
424. Treas. Reg. 65, art. 1566(a)(1924), reprinted in 137 INTERNAL REVENUE
ACTS OF 1909-1950.
425. Rev. Rul. 55-749, 1955-2 C.B. 295. See Rev. Rul. 77-341, 1977-2 C.B. 402;
Harris v. United States, 431 F. Supp. 1173, 1177-79 (E.D. Va. 1977).
426. See supra text accompanying notes 185-89.
427. Cf. Oregon Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 192, 197 (1953), acq.,
1953-2 C.B. 5; Rev. Rul. 55-749, 1955-2 C.B. 295; M.H.S. Co. v. Commissioner, 45
T.C.M. (P-H) 721 (1976), affd per curiam, 575 F.2d 1177 (6th Cir. 1978).
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intangible and a physical property which is land. Since 1924 the reg-
ulations have concluded that land is like kind to a leasehold of a fee
with at least thirty years to run.
421
The thirty year possession test is equivalent to the standard for
land. Differences in location, attributes, and capacity for profitable
use have no bearing on whether land items are like kind. Differences
between the rights of a fee owner and those of a tenant are ignored.
All renewal periods count in computing the period of a leasehold.
Suppose a lease is for a term of twenty years, and permits two re-
newals of five years each. The lease is deemed to be for thirty years
since its terms permit it to continue for that period.429
Circumstances surrounding the term of the lease are not relevant.
Hence the fact that a renewal option might be allowed to lapse does
not affect the term of the lease. In one case, the parties to a ten year
lease were related. The IRS argued the relationship was the
equivalent of a renewal clause. In a 1975 opinion which was officially
reported, the Tax Court refused to consider matters which did not
appear on the face of the lease and concluded that the lease was not
like kind to land.430 When the period is not certain, probability is a
factor. A life estate satisfies the thirty year test if an actuarial table
concludes that the measuring life expectancy is thirty years. If the
period is not reasonably certain, then the thirty year test is applied
to the longest period for which the interest might continue. The typi-
cal oil and gas lease is for a fixed period plus the length of commer-
cial production. Attempting to predict the length of commercial pro-
duction is very speculative. The IRS appears to assume that leases
with commercial production clauses will satisfy the thirty year
test.
431
The thirty year possession test has been applied to several in-
tangibles. They include an ordinary lease, a life estate, an easement
and right-of-way, a right to purchase land, various mineral interests,
a timber contract, and a water right.432 Two cases compare land and
428. See supra note 86 and accompanying text; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-
1(c)(2) (1967).
429. Rev. Rul. 78-72, 1978-1 C.B. 258; Century Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 192
F.2d 155, 159-60 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 954 (1951).
430. Capri, Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 162, 181-82 (1975).
431. See supra text accompanying notes 204-13.
432. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-l(c)(2) (1967) (ordinary leases); Rev. Rul. 72-601,
1972-2 C.B. 467 (life estate); Rev. Rul. 72-549, 1972-2 C.B. 472 (easement and right of
way); Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1351-52 (9th Cir. 1979) (right to
purchase land); Rev. Rul. 68-331, 1968-2 C.B. 362 (oil leases); Oregon Lumber Co. v.
Commissioner, 20 T.C. 192, 197 (1953), acq., 1953-2 C.B. 5 (timber contract); Rev.
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an interest in a real estate partnership. In a 1976 memorandum
opinion, the Tax Court observed that a partnership interest was per-
sonalty under state law, and concluded that the properties were
unalike.4 3 The Sixth Circuit agreed in a per curiam opinion. 8 4 In a
1983 opinion which was reviewed, the Tax Court observed that gen-
eral partnership rights were similar to those of fee ownership and
concluded that the properties were like kind.435 The Ninth Circuit
agreed.436
The thirty year possession test creates a second class of land. The
like kind regulations do not mention short-term leases, and a series
of officially reported Tax Court decisions have concluded they are
not like kind to land. Judicial and administrative decisions which
equate land and short-term leases under the involuntary conversion
statute cast a long shadow over the like kind results.437 Under the
thirty year test, a life estate for less than thirty years is not like kind
to a fee interest.438 In one ruling, a person gave up a short-term lease
for a short-term lease. 39 The IRS observed there was no difference
in the leases and concluded they were like kind.440 Another person
gave up timber rights for six years and thirty-six months, and re-
ceived a timber right for ten years. In a 1978 memorandum opinion,
the Tax Court concluded the properties were like kind. 41
Movables Test
Intangibles may be deemed movables. State law presumably is not
a factor in determining whether an intangible will be treated as a
movable.4 2 The question is whether there is an adequate relationship
between the intangible and a physical property which is a movable.
A 1964 letter compares whiskey warehouse receipts. One receipt was
for barrels of four year old bourbon whiskey, and the other was for
newly distilled whiskey.443 The IRS observed that the "receipts re-
Rul. 55-749, 1955-2 C.B. 295 (water right).
433. M.H.S. Co. v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (P-H) 721, 734-35 (1976), affd per
curiam, 575 F.2d 1177 (6th Cir. 1979).
434. Id.
435. Magneson v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 767 (1983), affid, 753 F.2d 1490, 1495-
98 (9th Cir. 1985).
436. Id.
437. See supra text accompanying notes 166-71.
438. Rev. Rul. 72-601, 1972-2 C.B. 466. See Fleming v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.
818 (1955), rev'd on this issue, 241 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1957), Circuit Court rev'd and
Tax Court affid on this issue sub nom., Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 256 U.S. 260,
268 (1958).
439. Rev. Rul. 76-301, 1976-2 C.B. 241.
440. Id.
441. Everett v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 278 (1978). See supra text accompanying
note 427.
442. See Rev. Rul. 72-519, 1972-2 C.B. 466.
443. LTR 6401245210A (Jan. 24, 1964).
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present the whiskey and the transfer of the receipts represent con-
structive or symbolic delivery of the whiskey," and concluded the
properties were like kind.444
Privileges
The right to use an advantage is given the same treatment as
other possessory rights. The holder of a television network franchise
is entitled to several things, including the right to use network pro-
gramming. Presumably the rights and duties of holders of a
franchise vary somewhat from one network to another, and a given
franchise may be different from others issued by the same network.
One case compares an exclusive ABC affiliation to a primary CBS
affiliation and a secondary ABC affiliation.445 In a 1978 opinion a
court of claims trial judge concluded that the properties were like
kind.446 A 1978 letter concludes that federal savings and loan char-
ters are like kind. I
Television network franchises give the holders rights to restrict the
use of network programming by other persons. Legal monopolies
supply similar rights. Thus a 1984 letter concludes that trade names
are like kind.448 Owners of copyrights, patents, and trademarks are
entitled to similar privileges. Hence a common-law copyright is like
kind to a statutory copyright and a patent on a wheelbarrow is like
kind to a patent on an atomic bomb. A patent on an atomic bomb is
like kind to a television network franchise.
The privilege concept has been applied to memberships in com-
mercial exchange organizations. In one case, a person conveyed five
chamber of commerce memberships. 449 Later on the same day, the
transferee conveyed five like memberships to the person. Each of the
transfers were made on the books of the exchanges. In a 1927 opin-
ion which was officially reported, the Board concluded the properties
were like kind.450 In a 1945 opinion which was officially reported, the
444. Id.
445. Forward Communications Corp. v. United States, 42 A.F.T.R.2d 5334, 5347-
50 (Ct. Cl. Trial J. Op. 1978), revd on another issue per curiam, 609 F.2d 485, 502 (Ct.
CI. 1979). See LTR 6111166240A (Nov. 16, 1961); LTR 8340041 (July 5, 1983); Rev.
Rul. 85-135, 1985-2 C.B. 181.
446. Id.
447. LTR 7824051 (Mar. 17, 1978).
448. LTR 8453034 (Sept. 28, 1984).




Tax Court concluded that stock exchange seats were like kind.41 '
Goods
The right to sell goods is given the same treatment as other posses-
sory rights. The holder of a milk production contract has the right to
force the buyer to purchase his goods. Hence he can insist that the
purchaser take possession and he may have a right to repossess if the
purchaser defaults. A 1972 letter compares milk production con-
tracts which are regulated by statute.452 A modification of the stat-
ute enlarged the existing rights of dairymen. The IRS concluded
that the new contracts were like kind to the old contracts.453
A right to buy goods should be given the same treatment. A per-
son who buys goods typically has the right to insist that the other
party deliver the goods.4 54 A contract presumably could prevent the
seller from disposing of the goods to another person, which might be
tantamount to forcing the seller to perform under the contract. Dif-
ferences in remedies do not appear to be a grounds for distinguishing
contracts. A contract to purchase an automobile is like kind to a
contract to purchase corn futures.
Services
The right to purchase services is given the same treatment as
other possessory rights. A player contract gives a team the right to
the services of an athlete, and to prevent him from working for an-
other team.455 A 1967 ruling concludes that major league baseball
player contracts are like kind,456 and a 1971 ruling reaches the same
conclusion for professional football player contracts.457 A person who
sells a business frequently will agree to provide future services under
similar conditions. A noncompetition covenant merely provides an
additional remedy in the event of breach. Hence there is no apparent
reason to distinguish between contracts which include a noncompeti-
tion covenant and those which do not. A right to receive the services
of an athlete is like kind to a right to receive the services of an
artist.458
The right to sell services should be given the same treatment. A
person who sells services typically has only the right to insist that the
451. Horne v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 250 (1945).
452. LTR 7204240570A (Apr. 24, 1972).
453. Id.
454. See supra text accompanying notes 443.
455. See Rev. Rul. 67-379, 1967-2 C.B. 127. See generally Selig v. United States,
52 A.F.T.R.2d 5314 (E.D. Wis. 1983), affd, 740 F.2d 572 (7th Cir. 1984).
456. Rev. Rul. 67-380, 1967-2 C.B. 291.
457. Rev. Rul. 71-123, 1971-1 C.B. 104. See generally Harmelink & Vigues, Tax
Aspects of Baseball Player Contracts and Planning Opportunities, 59 TAXES 535 (1981).
458. See supra text accompanying notes 66-69.
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other party accept the service.459 A contract presumably could pre-
vent the buyer from purchasing similar services, which might be tan-
tamount to forcing the buyer to accept services under the contract.
Differences in remedies do not appear to be grounds for distinguish-
ing contracts. A right to sell the services of an athlete is like kind to
a right to sell the services of an artist.460
Partnership Interests
An interest in a partnership is given the same treatment as other
possessory rights.461 An interest in a partnership may be like kind to
another interest in the same partnership. Three tests are applied in
comparing interests.4 62 One is the nature of the interest. General
partnership interests may be like kind and limited partnership inter-
ests may be like kind. The Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit have
concluded that a general partnership interest is not like kind to a
limited partnership interest.4 "6  The conclusion is suspect.4 64 The
partnership interests must relate to the same type of business, and
the same type of underlying assets. In a 1963 opinion, a district
court concluded that an interest in a tavern partnership was like kind
to an interest in an auto supply partnership.4 65 The difference in
businesses apparently would be fatal under current criteria.4 66 There
is no apparent reason to distinguish a tavern business and an auto
supply business.
Excluded Property
Various debt and equity interests cannot be like kind property. In
1921 the Treasury and Congress expressed doubt about the like kind
status of securities. The 1921 House Bill permitted holding for pro-
ductive use in trade or business or for investment. The Senate de-
leted the investment clause to prevent securities abuse. The Confer-
459. See, e.g., Foy v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 50 (1985).
460. See supra text accompanying notes 66-69.
461. Magneson v. Commissioner, 753 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1985). See supra text
accompanying note 416.
462. See infra text accompanying note 463-66.
463. Meyer v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 311, 314 (1972), nonacq., 1975-1 C.B. 3;
Office Memoranda 18107 (Sept. 30, 1974); Office Memoranda 18881 (Nov. 23, 1977);
G.C.M. 34347 (Dec. 15, 1977); Action on Decision: TC:T1 (Dec. 27, 1974), aft'd per
curiam, 503 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1974); Rev. Rul. 78-134, 1978-1 C.B. 256.
464. See supra text accompanying notes 411-14.
465. Miller v. United States, 12 A.F.T.R.2d 5244 (S.D. Ind. 1963).
466. E.g., Gulfstream Land & Dev. Corp. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 587, 592
(1979).
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ence Report does not explain why the investment clause was restored
to the bill. 467 The statute created a windfall for people who had in-
vested in securities. Practically before the 1921 Act had been signed
into law, brokerage houses started soliciting business. A person who
wanted merely to modify his portfolio, or to obtain cash, could do so
by an exchange. The practice of obtaining tax-free cash as part of an
exchange of securities would have been stopped by the boot rule
which was added by the 1923 Act. Congress went further by dis-
qualifying various sorts of paper from like kind status.
The original 1923 bill deleted the investment clause. When it was
advised of the probable consequences, the Treasury prepared a pro-
posal which continued the general investment clause and added vari-
ous investment securities to the list of excluded property. The Com-
mittee of the Whole House accepted the Treasury approach and the
Senate agreed. Because most securities are held for investment, the
reason for disqualifying them is not clear. One possibility is overkill
of the boot problem. Another is that securities are not a type of in-
vestment for which Congress intended to provide an exemption. The
extent to which the reorganization rules may have affected like kind
policy is unknown.468
The paper clause covers two classes of undertakings. First,
promises to pay money are included as a backstop for the boot rule.
Suppose a person receives cash from a nonrecourse loan for which he
pledges property as security, and later exchanges the property sub-
ject to the debt. If the exchange is tax free, the result would be the
same as if he had received cash as part of the exchange. Although
the debt clause covers any obligation which creates a debtor-creditor
relationship, the outer limits of the provision are uncertain. A 1975
letter suggests money may be indebtedness if the issuing government
promises to redeem it for a stated amount.469
The second class of paper is securities. The scope of the securities
provision is not clear because the statutory language is very broad.
Terms such as stocks and bonds seem to be limited to undertakings
by corporations and corporate-type entities. Phrases like "other se-
curities or evidences of indebtedness or interest," 470 include relation-
467. H.R. REP. No. 486, 67th Cong., Ist Sess. 17 (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B.
209. Revenue Act of 1921: Hearing on H.R. 8245 Before the Senate Finance Comm.,
67th Cong., 1st Sess. 200-02 (1921).
468. S. REP. No. 1113, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 1 (1923), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt. 2)
C.B. 845.
469. LTR 7507220610A (July 22, 1975). Money is not a debt. See e.g., F. MANN,
THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 5-7 (3d ed. 1971); A. NUSSBAUM, MONEY IN THE LAW:
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 139-43 (rev. ed. 1950).
470. The complete text of the paper clause is: "(B) stocks, bonds, or notes, (C)
other securities or evidences of indebtedness or interest, (D) interest in a partnership, (E)
certificates of trust or beneficial interests, or (F) choses in action." I.R.C. §
1031(a)(2)(B-F) (1986). See Horne v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 250 (1945); Jacobson v.
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ships which have no connection with a corporation.
The IRS has not applied the securities clause consistently. A 1984
letter concluded that stock issued by a cooperative housing corpora-
tion was not excluded property. 17' The IRS has repeatedly argued
that partnership interests are disqualified property because of lan-
guage in the securities clause. In every case, the courts have found
general partnership interests to be like kind. Without discussion, a
1963 district court opinion concludes that an interest in a tavern
partnership was like kind to an interest in an automobile supply
partnership.4 7 2 In a 1972 case, the IRS did not argue the interests
were unalike.4 73 Instead it relied on the securities exclusion. In a re-
viewed opinion, the Tax Court concluded the properties were like
kind.47
4
The reaction to the 1972 Tax Court decision seemed to border on
hysteria. The IRS prepared a blizzard of paper including an action
on decision, two office memoranda, a general counsel's memoran-
dum, and a revenue ruling.475 Each document repeated the exclusion
argument. Attacking the problem with lots of paper did not work.
Three more cases were decided by the Tax Court.4 6 Statements in
the last opinion leave the impression that the court had grown tired
of telling the IRS it was wrong. 7 The court observed that it was
well established that general partnership interests could be like kind,
and that excluded property arguments had been rejected several
times.4 7 8 The opinions also observe that partnership assets and busi-
ness interests would be compared in order to prevent tax avoidance.
The IRS's persistence and the somewhat equivocal approach of the
Tax Court have encouraged the preparation of articles.
47 9
Commissioner, 336 U.S. 28 (1949). See generally I.R.C. § 385 (1986).
471. LTR 8445010 (July 30, 1981). See Warda v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-
H) 2681, 2684-85 (1985). See generally Levine & Glicklish, Tax-Free Real Estate
Transactions, 12 J. REAL EST. TAx 375, 378 (1985); Miller, Condominiums and Cooper-
atives, 13 J. REAL EST. TAX'N 96 (1985).
472. Miller v. United States, 12 A.F.T.R.2d 5244 (S.D. Ind. 1963).
473. Meyer v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 311, 314 (1972), nonacq., 1975-1 C.B. 3
a fd on another issue per curiam, 503 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1974).
474. Id.
475. Office Memoranda 18107 (Sept. 30, 1974); Office Memoranda 18881 (Nov.
23, 1977); G.C.M. 34347 (Dec. 15, 1977); Action on Decision: TC:TI (Dec. 27, 1974),
Rev. Rul. 78-134, 1978-1 C.B. 256.
476. Gulfstream Land & Dev. Corp. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 587 (1979); Long
v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1045 (1981); Pappas v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1078 (1982).
477. Pappas, 78 T.C. at 1084-87.
478. Id.
479. E.g., Brier, Like-Kind Exchanges of Partnership Interests: A Policy Oriented
Approach, 38 TAx L. REV. 389 (1983). The article includes a nonexclusive list of other
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Eventually the IRS prevailed. The last decision was rendered in
1982, and appeals were dismissed in 1983.480 Dismissal of an appeal
probably would not be remarkable, except it seemed unlikely that
the IRS would give up. Between the time the government's notice of
appeal was filed and the dismissal date, the IRS apparently decided
it has little or no chance to prevail in court. The IRS was able to sell
its arguments to Congress. On March 1, 1984, the Ways and Means
Committee amended the 1984 bill with a proposal to add partnership
interests to the list of excluded property."" Although the House re-
port suggested a similarity between excluded securities and partner-
ship interests, the major concern was reducing tax avoidance.8 2
Congress felt the tax avoidance approach of the Tax Court might
not be adequate to prevent abuse.
The change is equivocal for two reasons. The exclusion is intended
to apply only to an exchange of interests in different partnerships.
Thus, interests in the same partnership may be like kind. The change
is not to be used as the basis for an inference as to the proper treat-
ment of an exchange of interests in different partnerships under prior
law.48 3 Thus, partnership decisions under prior law seem to have
been accepted as the means for ascertaining whether interests in the
same partnership are like kind.
One decision raises several questions.4 84 A person gave up fee sim-
ple title to land for an interest in a land trust. In a 1977 memoran-
dum opinion, the Tax Court found that the trust interest was not
excluded property and concluded that the properties were like
kind.48 5 The statute of uses might be a ground for disregarding a
trust. If a trustee has no duty other than holding title, the corpus is
automatically conveyed to the beneficiary. Because the trustee did
have an express duty to follov directions of the person and there was
discussion of state law, one can only speculate about whether the
statute of uses was a ground for the decision.488
Grantor trust status is another possibility. If a trust is a grantor
trust, an actual or deemed grantor is taxed as if the trust did not
exist. Although the trust was a grantor trust, the court did not dis-
cuss the grantor trust rules. One can merely guess about whether the
articles. Id. at 389 n.5.
480. Pappas v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1078 (1982).
481. H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1231-34 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 711, 897-898.
482. Id.
483. Id.
484. Rutland v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (P-H) 39 (1979).
485. Id.
486. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 1.27, 1.29 (A. Casner ed. 1952); 1 ScowT
ON TRUSTS §§ 67-69 (3d ed. 1967).
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grantor trust rules were a ground for the result. 487 The court found
the trust was a mere nominee since the person had all the benefits
and burdens of ownership. Hence the trust interest was deemed to be
direct ownership of trust corpus.
488
IRS Attitude
The IRS has not come to grips with the treatment of intangibles.
Several letters suggest an inability or unwillingness to identify the
rules and make a reasonable application of the rules to the facts. A
1983 letter compared land to a grazing lease.489 The IRS mentioned
some dictionary material. There was no reference to the tax authori-
ties on the classification of leases, or the effect of renewal rights.
Because the tenant had a right to renew every five years, tax author-
ities would treat the lease as like kind to land. 90 Hence the conclu-
sion that the properties were unalike is wrong. 91
Other authorities reflect a similar approach. A 1982 letter com-
pared land to an interest in a real estate investment trust. 92 The
IRS observed that an interest in a trust was excluded property and
concluded that properties were unalike.493 A 1984 letter compared
land to stock issued by a cooperative housing corporation.494 The
IRS concluded that the stock was like kind to land.495
While letters are not precedent, they are acceptable evidence of
administrative practice. 496 An ad hoc decision-making process does
not satisfy the congressional goal of reducing uncertainty.
CONCLUSION
A large percentage of the problems under the like kind statute are
due to failure to give the system a reasonable chance. Congress could
487. Treas. Reg. § 1.671-3(a)(1) (1969). I.R.C. §§ 677(a)(1), 678(a)(1) (1986).
One case suggests that the grantor trust rules are the exclusive route to making a grantor
the owner of corpus. Lerner v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 290, 301-02 (1978), acq., in re-
suit, 1984-1 C.B. 1.
488. Rutland v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (P-H) 39, 46-48 (1977). See supra text
accompanying note 219.
489. LTR 8327003 (Mar. 17, 1983).
490. Id. See generally Uecker v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 983 (1983), af'd per
curiam, 766 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1985).
491. Id.
492. LTR 8206109 (Nov. 12, 1981); see also LTR 6204185740A (Apr. 18, 1962).
493. LTR 8206109 (Nov. 12, 1981).
494. LTR 8445010 (July 30, 1984). Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(d)-l(e) (1967).
495. LTR 8445010 (July 30, 1984).
496. See Rowan Cos., Inc. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 260-63 (1981).
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have provided a better explanation for the like kind standard. Enact-
ing a general statute and asking an expert to prepare a program for
applying it is a reasonable approach to legislation. Congress appears
to have done everything the Treasury has asked for. The only point
where the current statute might be defective is in the boot rules.
Treating debt relief as a ground for recognition of gain is inconsis-
tent with other provisions such as the reorganization rules. Because
there is no apparent reason to require recognition, the like kind stat-
ute probably should be amended to conform to the other provisions.
The IRS seems to be in the next position. The IRS is a hybrid.
Some of its functions require a balanced approach to administration
of the statute. There is no excuse for issuing letters and rulings
which misconstrue the law, or reach inconsistent results. Other IRS
functions call for adversarial skills. Some IRS lawyers admit they
will say almost anything to win a case. It is hard to criticize them for
trying to do their job.
The courts appear to be in the third slot. Land decisions usually
are not objectionable. Arguments based on investment details typi-
cally are brushed aside in favor of applying Treasury policy. Some
decisions involving movables and intangibles create a different pic-
ture. These decisions leave the impression that the results were based
on whim.
The Treasury has not made a reasonable attempt to perform its
duty. The boot netting rules do not follow generally acceptable tax
principles, nor do they appear to have a logical justification. The use
and investment criteria are contrary to express congressional policy.
The Treasury did issue a general standard for land in 1921. After
sixty-five years, it is unlikely that the Treasury will voluntarily issue
general standards for movables or intangibles. It appears the Trea-
sury has failed to do its job for two categories of property. A general
statue without standards for application does not satisfy the congres-
sional goal of reducing uncertainty in tax planning.
The day when problems can be ignored with a reasonable expecta-
tion that they will quietly go away may be coming to an end.497 Con-
gress has expressed a degree of annoyance with lack of speedy action
by the Treasury. The 1984 Act imposed what amounted to sanctions
for failure to issue certain regulations by the end of 1984.498 The
Treasury met the deadline. The 1986 Act has similar deadlines for
497. There is some possibility that the Treasury wrote its own death warrant.
Compare a 1979 epitaph to actions by the Treasury between 1980 and 1983. B. BITrKER
& J. EUSTICE, supra note 61, at 4-16; Withdrawal of Treasury Decision 7747 Relating to
Debt and Equity, 48 Fed. Reg. 31,053 (1983).
498. Tax Reform Act of 1984, § 524(e), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 872. Regulations in question and answer form were proposed on March 15,
1983, and finalized on December 27, 1984. Treas. Reg. § 1.416-1 (1984).
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the issuance of regulations on several topics. 9  Another approach is
to haul an agency into court. In one case, a person sued the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) for a failure to issue regulations. 0
The court found the EPA had a duty to act, and gave the EPA sixty
days to issue regulations. It was only after the court threatened a
sentence for contempt that the EPA issued the regulations .5 0 A per-
son should not have to resort to Congress or the judiciary in order to
force an administrative agency to issue regulations.
499. E.g., Tax Reform Act of 1986, §§ 1141, 1151(k), reprinted in Fed. Taxes (P-
H) Report Bull. No. 41 (extra) (Sept. 20, 1986). A description of similar IRS delays was
offered during Senate hearings on the 1986 Conference Bill. 132 CONG. REc. S13959-60
(daily ed. Sept. 27, 1986) (statements of Sen. Baucus and Sen. Packwood). For example,
the IRS was given 60 days from enactment to issue model amendments. Conference
Report No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-491, reprinted in Fed. Taxes (P-H) Report Bull.
No. 41 (extra) (Sept. 20, 1986).
500. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 602 F. Supp. 892 (N.D. Cal. 1984), request for
stay denied sub nom., Thomas v. Sierra Club, 105 S. Ct. 829 (1985), appeal to Ninth
Circuit pending sub nom., Sierra Club v. United States, Nos. 84-2845, 85-1523.
501. Id. See generally Darst, EPA, Bowing to Court Order, Adopts Disputed Ra-
diation Standads, Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan. 18, 1985, at 7-A, col. 1.
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